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Federalism and the Financing of Health Care 
in Canada and Switzerland: Lessons for 
Health Care Reform in the United States 
Paul J Donahue" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the myriad of variables which health care reform in the 
United States must address is how reform should, at the level of the 
theoretical ideal, and must, at the level of pragmatic politics, take into 
account the federal organization of the government. As the research 
which underlies this article has again reminded the author, the Ameri-
can situation is unique. The lessons foreign models teach may not be 
relevant to the United States, and if relevant, may not be easy to apply. 
Nevertheless, it would be foolish to shape health care reforms with the 
potential to affect American society as profoundly as any other govern-
mental initiatives in the history of the Republic without trying to learn 
whatever we can from the experience of others. The collapse in 1994 
of the Clinton administration's major initiative for national health care 
reform heightens the importance of examining the experience of 
other federal states. l Health care reform, at least for the foreseeable 
future, is likely to occur in small steps, taken both by the federal 
government and by the states.2 
It is at least plausible to hypothesize that the experience of other 
federally organized states is more relevant to the American situation 
than that of more unitary states. That hypothesis forms the first prin-
ciple of selection for this study. Further, the choice of Canada seemed 
clear because discussion of the Canadian health care system has been 
such an important part of the American health care debate. The 
* A.B., Dartmouth College (1968); Ph.D. (Religious Studies), Yale University (1973), J.D., 
(1992). The author is a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries and a Member of the American Academy 
of Actuaries. 
1 For an analysis of health care economics which includes a discussion of the theoretically ideal 
health care reform and of how closely the Clinton proposals approximated the ideal, see PaulJ. 
Donahue, Federal Tax Treatment of Health Care Expenditures: Is It Part of the Health Care Problem? 
46 WASH. UJ. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 141 (1994). 
2 See id. 
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limited and recently changed role of government in Switzerland, and 
its high level of health care spending, suggested that Switzerland too 
would have important lessons to offer American policy makers, and 
the results have fully justified that expectation. 
This article discusses each country separately. Within each section, 
I begin with a very brief discussion of political history and structures. 
I then discuss where constitutional responsibility for health care lies 
and describe the division of responsibility and authority for health care 
financing between the federal government and those of the States or 
Cantons. A description of the origins and evolution of government 
financing of health care follows. 
Documentation of the history and content of legislation affecting 
government health care financing and of the political dynamic which 
shaped it is one of the most important objectives of this article. I found 
as I read many articles discussing health care financing, most notably 
about health care in Canada, that references to primary sources were 
few. I found myself wondering whether or not the interpretations I was 
reading were accurate, and realizing that I did not have enough infor-
mation to decide. I decided that there was considerable value simply 
in setting forth the history of health care financing legislation in a 
reasonably comprehensive way that would permit others to evaluate 
the judgments I made about that legislation. Further, the history of 
legislation and of the political dynamic is the source most likely to 
provide lessons for proponents of health care reform in the United 
States.3 
Lastly, this article discusses the extent and nature of government 
intervention in health care financing, and assesses the effect of gov-
ernment intervention on total health care spending. In conclusion, I 
generalize briefly the basis of the individual sections, and offer some 
observations on what the American health care reform effort might 
learn from those in Canada and Switzerland.4 
~ I should make clear at the outset what the reader would in any case soon discern, that I believe 
that economic efficiency requires fundamental changes in health care financing in the United 
States. In the context of the current system, I believe that managed care has made an important 
contribution to increasing the cost-effectiveness of health care expenditures. 
4 In a subsequent article, the author plans to extend his analysis to Australia and Germany. 
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II. CANADA 
A. History 
Permanent European settlement of what became Canada began with 
the arrival in 1604 of French colonists under the leadership of Samuel 
Champlain of Brouage.5 Mter spending the years 1604-1607 at the 
mouth of the Bay of Fundy, on July 3, 1608, Champlain founded the 
city of Quebec, the oldest site of continuous European habitation in 
Canada.6 The settlement gained solidity with the arrival of more colo-
nists and cattle in 1634.7 A further infusion near the end of the 1660s 
and subsequent small and intermittent immigration from Frances grew 
into the modern French Canadian population of approximately seven 
million, nearly 25% of Canada's population of 28.8 million.9 
A long period of French and British conflict, conducted on two 
continents, resulted in the cession of French Canada to Great Britain 
in 1763.10 English settlement in Nova Scotia and in the province of 
Quebec and in the region of Lake Ontario received a substantial 
impetus by the flight of United Empire loyalists from the British colo-
nies which became the United States. l1 A more important source was 
the settlement of the rich agricultural lands of Ontario by American 
immigrants.12 In 1791, British North America was divided into Upper 
and Lower Canada, roughly corresponding to modern Ontario and 
Quebec.13 Fifty years later, in an effort to put the English stamp more 
firmly on Quebec, and to introduce representative government, this 
partition was reversed. 14 The fur trade prompted the settlement of 
central Canada, by way of Hudson's Bay,15 and of what became British 
Columbia, both overland from the east and by sea.16 The gold rush 
5 See]. Bartlet Brebner, Canada, A Modern History, in THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HISTORY 
OF THE MODERN WORLD 28--29 (Allan Nevins & Howard M. Ehrmann eds., 1960). 
6 See id. at 28--29, 30. 
7 See id. at 36. 
8 See id. at 46. 
9 See Telephone Interview with Denise Maynard of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, quoting data from 
tlIe 1996 and 1991 censuses [hereinafter Maynard Interview]. 
10 See Brebner, supra note 5, at 72. 
II See id. at 107. 
12 See id. at 109. 
13 See id. at 109-10. 
14 See id. at 222-23,241-42. 
15 See Brebner, supra note 5, at 245. 
16 See id. at 249-52. 
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along the Fraser River gave a tremendous boost to the settlement of 
British ColumbiaP 
The British North American Act of 1867 created the Dominion of 
Canada by uniting Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario, 
and provided its constitution.18 Central Canada joined the Dominion 
in 1870, with the creation of the Province of Manitoba and the North 
West Territories.19 Saskatchewan and Alberta were created out of the 
territories in 1905.20 British Columbia was admitted in 1871, and Prince 
Edward Island in 1873.21 Newfoundland did not become part of Can-
ada until 1949.22 
B. Constitution 
Canada is a monarchy whose sovereign is that of the United King-
dom. 23 The sovereign is represented in Canada by a Governor-Gen-
eral.24 The constitution is silent as to the manner of appointment and 
tenure of the Governor-General, but since 1930, all Canadian Gover-
nors-General have been selected by the Canadian Prime Minister, who 
also determines the Governor-General's tenure. 25 The upper House of 
Parliament, the legislative authority, is the Senate, whose members are 
appointed for life by the Governor-General.26 Provincial representation 
moderates the weight given to population.27 The lower house is the 
House of Commons, where the membership is allocated on the basis 
of population.28 The executive power of government rests in the cabi-
net, which was not mentioned in the Constitution Act, 1867,29 and 
especially in the Prime Minister, who exercises in practice most of the 
authority constitutionally assigned to the Governor-Generapo 
17 See id. at 252. 
18 See id. at 289. 
19 See id. at 292. 
20 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 229 (3d. ed. 1992 (bound ed.)). 
21 See Brebner, supra note 5, at 293. 
22 See id. at 497-98. 
2S See HOGG, supra note 20, at 232 nn.14-16. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) §§ 24, 29; HOGG, supra note 20, at 1308-09. 
27 See CAN. CONST. § 22; HOGG, supra note 20, at 1307. 
28 See CAN. CONST. § 22; HOGG, supra note 20, at 1307. 
29 See HOGG, supra note 20, at 234. 
so See, e.g., id. at 233. 
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The drafters of the Constitution Act, 1867, intended Canada to have 
a strong central government.3l Residual governmental power belongs 
to the federal government.32 Early on, the federal government exer-
cised power over the provinces like that of an imperial government 
over its colonies.33 Due in part to judicial decisions which gave a narrow 
interpretation to the principal federal powers, the residuary and trade 
powers, and a wide interpretation to the principal provincial power, 
over property and civil rights, and in part to other tendencies in 
Canada, however, the current Canadian system is less centralized than 
that either of Australia or the United States.34 
Canada is a country of remarkable physical, climactic, and ethnic 
diversity, as one would expect based on its history.35 Particularly impor-
tant is the linguistic and cultural division between Quebec and the rest 
of Canada.36 These diversities, especially ethnic diversity, have no doubt 
contributed to the functionally greater role that the provinces play in 
Canada's government than do the states of the United States. 
C. Responsibility for Health Care 
Health care services fall exclusively within the areas of provincial 
responsibility.37 Section 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives the 
provinces authority over hospitals.38 An expansive reading of the "prop-
erty and civil rights in the province" clause of Section 92(3) of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867 gave the provinces authority over the medical pro-
fession, as well as over a contributory insurance program.39 Through 
use of conditional grants of federal funds, however, the federal govern-
ment prompted the introduction of provincial insurance both for 
hospitalization and medical services.40 
31 See id. at 108. 
32 See id. at 435-36. 
33 See id. at 1l0. 
34 See HOGG, supra note 20, at 110-11. 
35 See Brebner, supra note 5, at 515-18. 
36 See id. at 518. 
37 See, e.g., CAN. CONST. § 92(7), (3). 
38 See id. § 92(7). 
39 See HOGG, supra note 20, at 149 & n.33. 
40 See id. at 149-50. 
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D. Origins of National Health Insurance 
Although government previously had been involved in health care 
delivery, it was the economic pressures of the depression and of the 
Second World War that made public health insurance a national is-
sueY In 1945, the national government made a proposal which was 
unacceptable to the wealthier provinces.42 Although voluntary prepay-
ment plans moved quickly to fill the void, the absence of such plans in 
Saskatchewan led the Co-{)perative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) 
government there to introduce a universal hospital insurance plan in 
1947.43 British Columbia followed suit in 1949, and Alberta in 1950.44 
When Newfoundland became part of the Dominion in 1949, half its 
population was already covered by a government program,45 estab-
lished by the British-appointed government that preceded Newfound-
land's entry into Canada and modeled on that for the Scottish High-
lands and Islands.46 
Not only did government-provided hospital insurance take root as 
the result of provincial initiative, but so did the enactment of a national 
program.47 As a result of a proposal by the Prime Minister of Ontario 
at the 1955 Conference on Tax Agreements, the national government 
was forced to enact the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services 
Act.48 
E. Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act 49 
The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act is of astonishing 
brevity for major social legislation, little over five pages long.50 Section 
41 See Malcolm G. Taylor, The Canadian Health Care System 1974-1984, in MEDICARE AT 
MATURITY: ACHIEVEMENT, LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 3 (Robert G. Evans & Gregory L. Stoddart 
eds., 1986). 
42 See id. at 4. The proposal involved granting the national government sole authority to tax 
incomes in return for the provision by the national government of a wide range of social 
insurance programs. See id. 
4~ See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See Gordon H. Hatcher, et aI., Health Services in Canada, in COMPARATIVE HEALTH SYSTEMS, 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES OF FOURTEEN NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 88 (Marshall W. Rattel ed., 
1984). 
47 See id. at 88-89. 
48 See id. at 5. 
49 Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, ch. 28, 1956-1957 S.C. 155 (Can.). 
50 See id. 
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3 authorizes the Minister of National Health and Welfare to enter into 
agreements with the provinces to contribute to the cost of hospital 
insurance furnished by a provincial program.51 Section 4 sets the con-
tribution rate by blending the national and provincial costs and reim-
bursing the provinces in the amount of half the blended rate multi-
plied by total hospital costs for covered persons. 52 
In order for a provincial program to quality, it needed do no more 
than: 
1. specifY the insured services to be provided, 
2. specifY the amount of authorized charges, 
3. include a schedule of hospitals, 
4. establish an administrative mechanism, 
5. make insurance available to all provincial residents on 
uniform terms and conditions, 
6. assure adequate monitoring of hospital standards, 
7. maintain adequate financial records, and 
8. provide for recovery of provincial expenditures where 
another party had legal liability by way of damages for the 
insured's hospital costs due to negligence or other wrongful 
act.53 
F. Medical Care Act 54 
Provincial initiative was also important to expansion of government 
support beyond hospital services to other health care services.55 Sas-
katchewan's CCF government used the federal revenues it received due 
to the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act to honor its 
fifteen year commitment to a comprehensive health insurance plan.56 
Also playing a role was the commitment of the out-of-power Liberals 
to a federally subsidized, provincially administered program at their 
January 1961 national policy conference.57 
51 See id. § 3. 
52 See id. § 4. 
53 See id. § 5, pts. 1, 2. 
54 Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563 (Can.). 
55 See e.g., Taylor, supra note 41, at 5. 
56 See id. Introduction of the plan provoked a doctor's strike, ultimately resolved by a compro-
mise which preserved the program, and a short-term exodus of physicians from the province. See 
ROBERT G. EVA:-.fS & MAUREEN M. LAw, THE CANADIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, WHERE ARE WE; 
How DID WE GET HERE? 10-11 (1991). 
57 See Taylor, supra note 41, at 5. 
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In part to counter this threat to its role in fashioning health care 
policy, the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker 
named a Royal Commission chaired by the Chief Justice of Saskatche-
wan to make recommendations.58 The Royal Commission reported in 
June 1964.59 Despite its conservative political parentage, and to the 
surprise of the medical and insurance industries, the Commission 
recommended a comprehensive range of benefits that would be fed-
erally subsidized and provincially administered.60 
The Medical Care Act is quite similar in form to the Hospital Insur-
ance and Diagnostic Services Act, but more direct in its mandate.61 It 
would be entirely possible to design a modest program of incentives to 
promote voluntary insurance administered by private entities and still 
to qualify for the matching grants of the Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act.62 As we shall see, a system of incentives to 
promote voluntary purchase would be much less likely to qualify, and 
arguably would have been intended not to qualify, for the grants of the 
Medical Care Act.63 
While the Medical Care Act does not quite achieve the brevity of the 
Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, it is still very short, 
only eight pages long.64 The Act grants contributions from the federal 
fisc toward the cost of qualifYing provincial plans to provide medical 
care services insurance.65 
The first qualification requirement is that: 
the plan is administered and operated on a non-profit basis 
by a public authority appointed or designated by the govern-
ment of the province ... that is responsible in respect of the 
administration and operation of the plan to the government 
of the province or to a provincial minister designated by the 
government of the province for such purpose, and that is 
subject in respect of its account and financial transactions to 
58 See id. at 6; EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 11. 
59 See Taylor, supra note 41, at 6; EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 11. 
60 See Taylor, supra note 41, at 6; EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 11. 
61 See Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, 563 (Can.); Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act, ch. 28, 1956-1957 S.C. 155, 155 (Can.). 
62 See Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, ch. 28, 1956-57 S.C. 155, § 5, pts. 1, 2 
(Can.). 
63 See Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, 563 (Can.). 
64 See id. 
65 See id. § 3. 
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audit by such person as is charged by law with the audit of 
the accounts of the province.66 
393 
This requirement appears to envision sole government administration, 
a "single-payer" to dredge up the adjectival phrase we are so accus-
tomed to associate with medical care insurance in Canada. Perhaps no 
province would have been able to win the concurrence of the federal 
cabinet to any other type of program.67 
It could be plausibly argued, however, that the pre-1966 Swiss system 
which is discussed below, a system of government incentives to the 
voluntary purchase of insurance from mutual companies with close 
government regulation, or indeed a program like that proposed in 
1994, by the Clinton administration, meets the formal requirement of 
administration and operation by a public authority.68 Those possibili-
ties appear to lie within the scope of provincial freedom of action 
as defined in Section 4(2), though the language of the section is 
sufficiently opaque as to leave some doubt: 
Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (1), a plan 
established by an Act of the legislature of a province does not 
fail to satisty the criteria set forth in that paragraph by reason 
only that it authorizes the designation by the provincial 
authority of an agency or agencies to carry out any responsi-
bility in connection with the receipt and payment of accounts 
rendered for insured services or authorizes any agency or 
agencies so designated to receive premiums or other accounts 
payable under the provincial law for remission to the provin-
cial authority, if under the provincial law it is a condition of 
any such designation that all individual accounts so rendered 
to which the designation extends are subject to assessment 
and approval by the provincial authority and that the 
amounts to be paid in respect thereof shall be determined by 
the provincial authority.69 
66 See id. § 4(a). 
67 See id. § 7(1). Section 7(1) leaves the determination of doubtful cases of qualification to the 
Governor in Council, which in a parliamentary system like that of Canada means the federal 
cabinet. See id.; HOGG, supra note 20, at 234. 
68 See H.R. 3600, 103d Congo (1993); S. 1757, 103d Congo (1993). 
69 Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, § 4(2) (Can.). 
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The point here is that the federal legislation should be construed to 
permit a greater degree of diversity in health care delivery systems than 
has in fact developed. 
The second requirement echoes the "uniform terms and conditions" 
requirement of the Hospital Act, but goes somewhat further. 70 It re-
quires: 
the payment of amounts ... in accordance with a tariff of 
authorized payments established pursuant to the provincial 
law or in accordance with any other system of payment autho-
rized by the provincial law, on a basis that provides for rea-
sonable compensation for insured services rendered by medi-
cal practitioners and that does not impede or preclude, either 
directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured 
persons or otherwise, reasonable access to insured services by 
insured persons. 71 
The preferred "uniform term" is a provincial fee schedule, but other 
payment mechanisms appear to be acceptable as long as they do not 
affect the out-of-pocket payments of the insured. Once again, a choice 
among health plans offering a standard plan would appear to qualifY. 
The third requirement is that the provincial plan cover at least 90% 
of insurable residents initially and 95% in the third and subsequent 
years.72 This appears to rule out, for practical purposes, incentives and 
a voluntary program, although, as we shall see, the Swiss achieved 99% 
participation with a program that was largely voluntary.73 Finally, the 
plan must provide a waiting period of no longer than three months 
and must provide continuation of coverage during that period.74 The 
contribution scheme parallels that for hospitalization plans. 
G. Established Program Financing Arrangement (EPFAJ15 
In an era of rapidly increasing medical costs, the open-ended nature 
of the federal financing commitment led to dissatisfaction at the fed-
70 See Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, ch. 28, 1956-1957 S.C. 155, § 5(2) (a) 
(Can.); Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, § 4(l)(b) (Can.). 
71 Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, § 4(I)(b) (Can.) .. 
72 See id. 
73 See La Reforme du Systeme de Sante en Suisse, Office federale des assurances sociales 5 (Feb. 
4, 1994) [hereinafter Swiss Reform]. 
74 See Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, § 4(1) (d) (Can.). 
75 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, ch. 10, 
1976-1977 S.C. 301 (Can.) [hereinafter 1977 Federal-Provincial Financing Act]. 
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erallevel with the system of matching contributions.76 At the provincial 
level, there was a desire for greater flexibility in the use of federal 
funds. 77 In 1977, the federal government imposed on the provinces a 
program of revenue-sharing and cash grants which replaced cost-shar-
ing, the EPFA.78 In the years after 1977, the federal government re-
duced its contributions under EPFA on three separate occasions, and 
in 1990, implicitly established a schedule for phasing out the cash grant 
part of EPF A. 79 
H. The Canada Health Act80 
Despite its declining financial contribution, the federal government 
acted in 1984 to establish greater control over program financing.81 
The federal Parliament enacted unanimously the Canada Health Act.82 
The Act consolidated federal health care legislation by repealing both 
the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act and the Medical 
Care Act,83 and reenacting and stiffening the operative qualification 
provisions of those Acts. Section 3 of the Act states that: "[T] he primary 
objective of Canadian health care policy is to protect, promote and 
restore the physical and mental well being of residents of Canada and 
to facilitate access to health services without financial or other barri-
ers."84 
Section 7 lists the requirements for federal funds.85 They are: (a) 
public administration; (b) comprehensiveness; (c) universality; (d) 
portability; and (e) accessibility. The requirement of public administra-
tion, spelled out in Section 8, is essentially the same as that contained 
in the Medical Care Act.86 It does nothing to restrict the legality under 
the Medical Care Act of a broader range of health care delivery systems 
than fee-for-service, for which I argued above.87 "Comprehensiveness" 
76 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 12. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 12-13. 
79 See id. at 13. 
80 Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273 (Can.). 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. § 32. 
84Id. § 3. 
85 See Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273, § 7 (Can.). 
86 See id. § 8; Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 1966-1967 S.C. 563, § 4(1) (Can.). 
87 See Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273, § 8 (Can.); Medical Care Act, ch. 64, 
1966-1967 S.C. 563 (Can.). 
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means that the provincial plan must cover all health care services 
provided by authorized providers to insured persons.88 "Universality" 
means just that: 100% of the provinces' residents, other than members 
of the military services or of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
prisoners, or persons resident for fewer than three months, must be 
insured.89 This requirement goes beyond the 95% participation re-
quired by the Medical Care Act.90 "Portability" limits the maximum 
waiting period to three months and requires reimbursement of medi-
cal expenses incurred by residents while temporarily outside the prov-
ince.91 The "accessibility" criterion reiterates the requirements found 
in the Medical Care Act.92 
Section 18 enacted a financial penalty on provinces that permitted 
balance billing. Section 19 enacted a parallel penalty for provinces 
which levied user charges. These provisions effectively eliminated both 
practices. The implementation of the balance-billing ban in Ontario 
led to a doctors' strike which lasted for twenty-five days in 1986.93 Lack 
of support among the public and among doctors themselves led to its 
abandonmen t. 94 
88 See Canada Health Act, ch. 6,1983-1984 S.C. 273, § 9 (Can.). On its face, this does not appear 
to allow the provinces to exclude purely optional medical services, like cosmetic surgery. See id. 
However, Evans and Law state that the requiremen t extends only to "medically necessary" services, 
which excludes elective cosmetic surgery. See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 19. Further, 
"medical" is narrowly defined, so that provinces can exclude coverage of all non-physician 
practitioner costs. See id. Although, as Evans and Law correctly point out, a more expansive 
approach to "medical necessity," along the lines of utilization review, could be used to contain 
costs, this is not an approach that has succeeded even when the government program stressed 
cost-effectiveness more explicitly than the Canadian program does. See id. 
89 See Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273, § 10 (Can.). As pointed out by Evans and 
Law, this requirement means that provincial governments cannot condition eligibility on pre-
mium payments. See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 18. Further, in a uniform public system with 
no choices in alternate delivery mechanisms available, premiums reduce to a regressive poll tax. 
See id. at 18 n.lO. However, that would not at all be the case where individuals can choose among 
programs meeting nationally imposed minimum standards, as in Switzerland and in the Clinton 
proposal for health care reform in the United States. SeeH.R. 3600, 103d Congo (1993); S. 1757, 
103d Congo (1993). Where individuals are free to choose "richer" coverage, it is important both 
for reasons of cost-containment and fairness that they bear fully the cost of any additional health 
care consumption that they choose. See Donahue, supra note I, at 141, 161-63. 
90 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
91 See 1984 Canada Health Act, ch. 6,1983-1984 S.C. 273, § 11 (Can.). 
92 See id. § 12; supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
93 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 13-14. 
94 See id. 
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I. Canada Health and Social Transfer 95 
The Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) was part of the 1995 
Budget Bill. CHST replaced federal funding for health care provided 
under the EPFA, as it had been reduced by changes subsequent to 
initial enactment.96 CHST continued the trend by limiting the potential 
growth in federal support for the provincial programs still further. 97 
If a province conditions the existence or form of coverage upon a 
minimum period of residence, in excess of the three month period 
permitted by Section 11 (a) of the Canada Health Act, Section 19 of 
CHST reduces the cash contribution to that province.98 If reductions, 
required by the Canada Health Care Act, to a province's federal health 
care contributions are in excess of the amount of the contributions, 
Section 23.2 permits the federal government to reach other funds 
which are due that province.99 
J. Ontario Health Insurance Act IOO 
As one could deduce from the brevity of the federal legislation 
alone, one cannot speak accurately of a "Canadian" program of gov-
ernment health insurance. Rather, in Canada, there are provincial 
programs of government health insurance that conform to the fed-
eral requirements for a federal subsidy. 101 We examine here Ontario's 
health care program. 
95 Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangement Act, ch. F-8, R.S.C. (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canada 
Health and Social Transfer). 
I am grateful to Renee St:Jacques, Senior Chief, Federal-Provincial Relations Division, Depart-
ment of Finance Canada, who not only provided me with statutory materials dealing with the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer, but also discussed its economic effect with me in a series of 
emails and telephone conversations. 
96 See EVA1'lS & LAw, supra note 56, at 12. 
97 See Canada Health and Social Transfer, supra note 95, § 15. Section 15 contains formulas to 
determine the total entitlement and to allocate the total to the provinces. See id. The total 
entitlement for the 1997-98 through 1999-2000 fiscal years was $25.1 billion. See id. The formula 
for determining a subsequent year's entitlement is to multiply the preceding year's entitlement 
by (B minus C). See id. § 17. B is the cube root of the quotient obtained by dividing the Gross 
Domestic Product for the calendar year ending in the preceding fiscal year, by the Gross Domestic 
Product for the calendar year ending in the fourth preceding calendar year. See id. C is 0.02 for 
the 2000"'{)1 fiscal year, 0.015 for the 2001-02 fiscal year and 0.01 for the 2002-03 fiscal year. See 
id. 
98 See Canada Health and Social Transfer, supra note 95, § 19. 
99 See id.; Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273 (Can.). 
100 Ontario Health Insurance Act, R.S.O., ch. H.6 (1990) (Can.). 
101 See, e.g., id. 
398 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
Section 2(1) makes the Minister of Health the public authority 
responsible for the Ontario plan for purposes of federallegislation. 102 
Section 4 vests administrative responsibility in a General Manager.103 
Section 5 establishes a Medical Review Committee, Section 6, Practitio-
ner Review Committees, and Section 7, a Medical Eligibility Committee 
to advise the General Manager.104 Section 8 creates an Appeal Board 
to hear appeals from administrative decisions of the General Man-
ager.105 
Section 13 states that insureds have the right to choose their own 
physician and that physicians have the right to refuse to treat persons 
insured under the Act.106 Section 14 prohibits private contracts of 
insurance for services covered under the Ontario Health Insurance 
Plan.107 Section 15 permits assignment of benefits provided the pro-
vider does not bill the insured and accepts Plan payment as payment 
in full. lOB Section 30 provides the subrogation required to qualifY for 
federal subsidy by the Medical Care Act.109 
The Ontario Health Insurance Act continues the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan which appears to have been established initially by the 
102 See id. § 2(1). 
103 See id. § 4. 
104 See id. §§ 5, 6, 7. 
105 See Ontario Health Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. H.6, § 8, (1990) (Can.). 
106 See id. § 13. 
107 See id. § 14. Evans and Law conclude, from the absence ofa private market for medicine in 
Canada, that ·'private' markets for medicine can persist only where they can be supported directly 
or indirectly by a public system." See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 19. This conclusion is patently 
false, as the nearby example of the United States ought to suffice to show. Rather, as Kenneth]. 
Arrow suggests, the risk onoss posed by illness is the quintessentially insurable risk. See Uncertainty 
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 945 (1963). This provision 
prohibits a private market in health care insurance. See id. It is this prohibition, rather than the 
existence of a public insurance system, which explains the absence of a private medical care 
market in Canada. See id. Where such insurance is permitted, as in Britain, private medical care 
markets do exist. See id. 
108 Ontario Health Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. H.6, § 15 (1990). Acting in concert with this 
provision, Chapter H.3, Section 2 of the Health Care Accessibility Act complies with the mandate 
of the Canada Health Act that the provinces prohibit balance billing. See Health Care Accessibility 
Act, RS.O., ch. H.3, § 2 (1990). Section 2 prohibits physicians who do not accept assignment of 
benefits under the Ontario Plan from charging or accepting payment greater than that which 
the Plan would have provided. See id. Further, it prohibits the physician from accepting payment 
from the insured until the physician has been notified that the Plan has reimbursed the insured, 
without explicit consent by the insured. See id. Section 8 makes violation of Section 2 an offense 
punishable by a fine of $2,000 and permits private prosecution. See id. §§ 2, 8. 
109 See Ontario Health Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. H.6, § 30 (1990) (Can.); Medical Care Act, 
ch. 64, 1966--1967 S.C. 563 (Can.). 
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Health Services Insurance Act. I1O The Health Services Insurance Act 
establishes the "Health Services Insurance Plan ... for the purpose of 
providing for insurance of the costs of insured health services and such 
other services on a non-profit basis on uniform terms and conditions 
available to all residents of Ontario,"lll parroting the conditional lan-
guage of the federal Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act.ll2 
Every resident of Ontario has the right to become an insured person 
on application to the Health Insurance Registration Board (Board) .113 
Benefits are payable for all services provided by health care practitio-
ners other than those which qualify for reimbursement under the 
Hospital Services Commission Act.114 
The Health Services Insurance Act requires employers of fifteen or 
more persons ("mandatory groups"), and permits employers of five to 
fifteen persons, to collect from their employees the premiums required 
by the Act. 1l5 The employees are primarily responsible for payment, 
but may bargain with their employers for an employer contribution.l16 
Section 13 establishes three classes of premiums-(I) single, (2) in-
sured with one dependent, and (3) insured with two or more depend-
ents-but leaves the amount of the premium to be established by 
regulation. ll7 Sections 17 and 18 give the Board sweeping authority to 
grant premium subsidies as it wishes, both permanent and temporary, 
through the promulgation of regulations. I1S 
The provincial government determines how much the plan will pay 
for each covered service by establishing by regulation a fee schedule 
for benefits under the plan,ll9 The Act also gives the provincial Minister 
of Health the authority to enter into arrangements for paying provid-
ers on a basis other than fee-for-service. 12°Where a provider intends to 
110 See id.; Health Services Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. 200 (1970) (Can.). 
111 Health Services Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. 200, § 3 (1970) (Can.). 
112 See Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, ch. 28, 1956-1957 S.C. 155, § 5, pts. I, 
2 (Can.). 
m See Health Services Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. 200, § 6 (1970) (Can.). 
114 See id. § 7. 
115 See Health Services Insurance Act, RS.O., ch. 200, §§ 9, 10 (1970) (Can.). 
116 See id. 
117 See id. § 13. 
118 See id. §§ 17, 18. 
119 See id. § 21. 
120 See Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.O., ch. 200, § 20, (1970) (Can.). Thus, although 
fee-for-service is the dominant form of physician payment, at least the legislation early provided 
for delivery alternatives. See Hatcher, et at. supra note 46, at 92. 
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charge an insured more than the plan will reimburse, the provider 
must inform the insured before the service is provided. l2l 
The Act gives the provincial government extraordinary authority to 
define critical elements of the plan by regulation. The Lieutenant 
Governor in Council may make regulations: 
(a) providing for enrollment, 
(b) defining dependents, 
(c) governing premium collection and information returns, 
(d) setting premium amounts, 
(e) determining subsidy qualifications, 
(f) defining eligible services, and 
(g) determining claims procedures,122 
as well as on a variety of other important administrative matters. 
K Enrollment 
As the brevity of the relevant legislation requires, and as the grant 
of regulatory authority permits, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan 
emerges only in Ontario regulations.123 It is only in the regulation that 
the degree of mandatory participation first emerges. 124 Employees who 
are part of a mandatory group must generally be members of that 
group for insurance purposes.125 Recipients of public assistance are 
enrolled as a result of actions required to be taken by program admin-
istrators. 126 Persons who are not compelled to participate may partici-
pate voluntarily by paying the premium required. 127 Full or partial 
premium subsidies are available for low-income applicants.128 Canadian 
enrollment and financing requirements deserve the attention they are 
receiving as possible models for the United States, even if other aspects 
of the Canadian system do not. 
121 See Hospital Services Insurance Act, R.S.O., ch. 200, § 22 (1970) (Can.). 
122Id. § 32. 
123 See Ontario Health Insurance Plan, R.R.O., Reg. 452 (1980) (Can.). 
124 See id. 
125 See id. § 3(1). 
126 See id. § 28(1). 
127 See id. § 23(1). 
128 See Ontario Health Insurance Plan, R.R.O., Reg. 432, § 27 (1980) (Can.). 
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L. Benefits 
Regulation 432, Section 37(5) makes chronic nursing home care a 
covered service. 129 Section 43 provides acute nursing home care.130 
Section 44 makes home care services covered services. 131 Section 38 
covers the following inpatient services: (1) room and board at standard 
rates, (2) necessary nursing provided and paid for by the hospital, (3) 
diagnostic and therapeutic laboratory, radiologic, and other tests, (4) 
prescribed drugs, and (5) use of operating or delivery rooms, includ-
ing anesthetic.132 
Section 39 covers the following outpatient services: (1) diagnostic 
tests, (2) radiotherapy, occupational therapy and physiotherapy, (3) 
speech therapy prescribed by a physician, (4) diet counseling when 
prescribed by a physician, (5) the hospital component of all other 
outpatient services, (6) home renal dialysis, (7) home hyperalimenta-
tion, and (8) home treatment of hemophilia. 133 Some dental, optomet-
ric, chiropractic, osteopathic and chiropodist services are covered.134 
Services provided by physicians are covered unless excluded.135 Physi-
cians are reimbursed based on a fee schedule.136 
M. Health Care in Practice 
The Canadian health care system is extremely popular with the 
public. Gallup polls in 1982 and 1984 showed that 80% of the Cana-
dian people were either ''very satisfied" or "quite satisfied" with their 
health care system.137 Indeed, the unanimous passage of the Canada 
Health Act, with its bans on user fees and balance billing, was testimony 
of the most eloquent sort to the popular appeal of the Canadian 
129 See id. § 37 (5). The Canada Health Act permits co-payments for chronic nursing home care, 
in an important exception to its ban on user charges. See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 22 n.15. 
Nevertheless, in this author's opinion, provision of any support for chronic nursing home care 
not tied to income puts the Canadian system ahead of current proposals for reform in the United 
States. 
130 See Ontario Health Insurance Plan, RRO., Reg. 432, § 43 (1980) (Can.). 
131 See id. § 44. 
132 See id. § 38. 
133 See id. § 39. 
134 See id. §§ 46-50. 
135 See Ontario Health Insurance Plan, RRO., Reg. 432, §§ 53(2), 54, 55(1) (1980) (Can.). 
136 See id. § 67. 
137 SeeJohn K. Iglehart, Health Policy RepUTt, Canada's Health Care System, 315 N. ENG.]. MED. 
202,203 (1990) [hereinafter Iglehart IJ. 
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approach. 138 John K Iglehart, writing in 1986, in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, stated: "Canada's health insurance program resem-
bles a pressure cooker that is building up steam on a hot stove. "139 
Three-and-a-half years later, he wrote that his original analogy held, 
but that the heat had been turned Up.140 In 1990, Canada had the 
second-highest per capita health care spending, exceeded, of course, 
only by the United States. 141 It also had the second highest compound 
growth rate for the period 1980-1990.142 
A recent article which appeared in the New York Times reinforced 
Iglehart's gloomy assessment of the delivery of health care in Can-
ada. 143 This purely anecdotal article focused on provider dissatisfaction 
and on the possibility of long waits for elective surgery.144 In contrast 
to this negative portrayal, according to an Angus Reid Report published 
in March 1996, 74% of Canadians think that their health care system 
is good or excellent. 145 This is a drop of only 6% compared to the early 
1980s, when health care costs were skyrocketing.146 
What makes the relative stability of consumer satisfaction especially' 
remarkable is that health expenditure data now tells a very different 
story from that at the beginning of the decade. Health care expendi-
tures as a percent of Cross Domestic Product (CDP) were 9.1 % in 
1990, rose to 9.8% in 1991, peaked at 10.1 % in 1992 and 1993, and 
fell to 9.7% in 1994.147 At 9.7% of CDP, Canada has fallen behind the 
most recent percentages for Switzerland, 9.9%, and France, 9.8%.148 
The federal contribution to the cost of provincial government health 
expenditures has declined from a peak of 44.6% in 1979, to 40.0% in 
138 See id. at 207. 
139Id. at 203. 
140 See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Canada s Health Care System Faces Its Problems, 322 
N. ENG.]. MED. 562, 568 (1990). 
141 George]. Schieber et aI., International Comparisons of Health Spending, 13 HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING REv. 5, tbl. 3 (1992). 
142 See id. 
143 See Anthony DePalma, Doctor, ~t's the Prognosis? A Crisis for Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
1996, at A3. 
144 See id. 
145 See Email to the author from Gary Holmes, Research Assistant, Health Canada (Mar. 14, 
1997). 
146 See POLICY AND CONSULTATION BRANCH, HEALTH CANADA, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDI-
TURES IN CANADA, tbl. 2A Gan. 1996) [hereinafter NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES]. Health 
care costs rose 16.12%, 18.04%, 16.90%, 10.53% and 7.74% for the years 1980 through 1984, 
respectively. Id. 
147 See id. at 28, tbl. 2. 
148 See id. at 20. 
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1985, to a low of 32.2% percent in 1992.149 The percentage federal 
contribution rose slightly in 1993 and 1994, to 32.3% and 33.0% 
respectively. 150 This happened because Established Programs Financing 
increases due to population growth outpaced increases in provincial 
health care spending.151 This progressive cost-shifting made the prov-
inces the payors of residual health care costs and, thus, appears to have 
transferred the incentive for cost-containment entirely to the prov-
inces. It was inevitable that it would take some experience dealing with 
the burden of residual payment in an era of high health care cost 
inflation before the provinces could formulate plans, and achieve the 
political consensus required, for effective cost-containment programs. 
It is also true that payment of non-hospital providers using fee 
schedules has moderated the rate of cost increases.152 Administrative 
costs have tended to rise only in line with inflation.153 Although an 
increase in utilization has increased total non-hospital provider in-
comes faster than inflation,154 the use of global budgets for hospitals 
has resulted in a steady decline in acute care utilization and in less 
rapid proliferation of high-cost technology.155 
The provinces now appear ready to take further action to contain 
costs. Since the effectiveness of any specific tactic for controlling utili-
zation tends to erode over time, Canadian provincial governments are 
increasingly exploring wider use of global budgets to reduce their 
health care costs.156 By 1991, Quebec and British Columbia had already 
imposed explicit caps on total outlays for physician services.157 Global 
caps for physician expenditures have spread beyond Quebec and Brit-
ish Columbia to include Manitoba. 158 Prince Edward Island, Nova Sco-
tia, Ontario, and Quebec restrict payments to individual physicians 
based on their total income.159 
149 See id. at 52. 
150 See id. 
151 See NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, supra note 146, at 35. 
152 SeeJohn K. Iglehart, Health Policy Repurt, Canada's Health Care System, 315 N. ENG.]. MED. 
778, 782 (1986); EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 35. 
153 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 35. 
154 See id. at 36. 
155 See id. at 37. 
156 See id. at 36. 
157 See id.; see also John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Repurt, The United States Looks at Canadian 
Health Care, 321 N. ENG.]. MED. 1767, 1771 (1989). 
158 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 36. 
159 See id. Above a specified amount, physicians' reimbursement is sharply reduced, in some 
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N. Administrative Expenses in a "Single-Payer" System 
An antipathy to what were perceived as unjustifiably high adminis-
trative expenses was a driving force in the impetus Canadian legislation 
gave to a "single-payer" system. 
The [Royal] Commissioners16o concluded that private, for-
profit insurers operated under incentives which tended to 
increase this form of overhead cost,161 adding to the expense 
of health care without adding to the resources available to 
provide it. High retention ratios (low loss ratios) were not an 
aberrant result of inefficiency, or a transient effect of small 
scale, but a fundamental characteristic of (successful) private 
insurance. This inherent tendency is strongly reinforced in a 
competitive environment with multiple insurers, in which the 
cost of intensive marketing and of increasingly careful risk 
selection must also be found out of the retention ratio (foot-
note omitted). Regarding the costs of the insurance mecha-
nism as unproductive overhead, they recommended central-
ized, non-profit administration in order to minimize them. 162 
The logic underlying this conclusion is highly suspect, though widely 
shared.163 Surely insurance companies have the same marketplace in-
centive to compete on levels of expense as do other profit-seeking 
firms. Market reforms short of complete centralization of administra-
tion, e.g., required acceptance of any applicant, with the resultant 
elimination of underwriting expense, and standardized, aggregated 
marketing, could have addressed concerns about specific types of ex-
cases clearly below the level of their marginal costs. Alberta formerly employed such limits but 
has repealed them. See id. 
160 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
161 "Overhead cost" as used here means the amount of premium retained by insurance compa-
nies to pay for their expenses and to provide a profit. 
162 EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 29. 
163 Based on the author's experience as a health care actuary in the large employer market, as 
recently as ten years ago, large employers in the United States focused almost entirely on insurer 
retention when considering the cost of their health benefit programs. Insurer pleas that employ-
ers ought to be looking at the total cost of their programs fell on unreceptive ears. However, as 
total cost exploded, the concept that a higher level of expense might reduce total costs became 
popular. This is, after all, the central assumption of the "managed care" movement. Naturally, 
not every cost-containment measure proved effective, and some that were initially effective 
became ineffective over time. 
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pense, while preserving the competitive incentives to reduce the levels 
of other expenses. 
Evans and Law consider the expense advantage of the Canadian 
system to be self-evident and substantiaI.I64 That premise has increas-
ingly come under attack. The basic argument is that: 
Any insurer, private or public, must perform three func-
tions: collect premiums, monitor and pay for services (control 
moral hazard), and bear the risk that is not eliminated by the 
law of large numbers. In private insurance markets, the cost 
of performing these functions appears as accounting over-
head of premium collection, claims administration, return on 
capital, and so forth. 
The methods used by public insurers to perform these same 
functions generate lower observable costs but much higher 
hidden costs.165 
While these counterattacks are themselves unpersuasive, their failure 
does not itself prove the superiority with respect to administrative 
expense of a single-payer system over health care reform like that 
proposed by the Clinton administration in the United States. As I have 
argued above, there is sound reason to hope that in such a system, 
funds devoted to administrative expense would be more cost-effective 
than in either the current American or Canadian systems. 
164 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 29--31. 
165Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs: Is Canada's System Really Less Expensive? 21 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 22 (Spring 1992). The article concludes that: "overhead costs in Canada, 
adjusted to include some of the most significant hidden costs, are indeed higher than they are 
under private insurance in the United States." Id. at 40. This conclusion rests on many dubious 
assumptions: e.g., the economic losses which result from financing by income taxation, estimated 
at a minimum of 17%; the costs of controlling overuse of medical resources by excess patient 
waiting, estimated at between 10 and 110% of physician expenditures and at more than 7% of 
hospital expenditures. See id. at 31-32, 37. An especially glaring omission given the latter argu-
ment is any comparison between mean patient waiting times in the United States and Canada. 
In proprietary insurance company studies to which the author has had access, no argument can 
be made that levels of expense are comparable without counting as a health care cost a share of 
the cost of provincial debt service proportionate to health care's share of provincial expenditures. 
Such treatment of debt would neither be historically accurate nor politically sound. It is clear 
that electorates as well as individuals are willing to pay for their health care. I do not think it rash 
to conclude that government-financed health care in Canada would survive a ban on deficit 
spending. 
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O. Generalizing from the Canadian Experience 
Evans and Law, reflecting on the history of government involvement 
with health care in Canada, make a series of generalizations which I 
think both apt and instructive, not only with respect to Canada, but 
also with respect to considering health care reform in the United 
States. l66 I give below a summarizing paraphrase: 
1. Things take a long time. Fifty years elapsed between the first serious 
discussions of government intervention and the establishment of the 
last provincial program. 
2. The present tends to be much like the past. Public funding has the 
effect of freezing in place the fee-for-service delivery mechanism. 
3. If it is not fixed, it stays broken. Government intervention left 
unaddressed and has not corrected patterns of overutilization and 
physician oversupply. 
4. Giving people things is easier than taking them away. Provider pre-
rogatives are especially difficult to curtail once granted.167 
There is, therefore, an implementation dilemma. Acceptance of 
change is easiest when change is minimal, but minimal change freezes 
in place existing problems.168 
1. Future Prospects 
Budgetary pressures on the federal and provincial governments are 
unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future, as evidenced by the enact-
men t of the Canada Health and Social Transfer.169 The Canadian insis-
tence on an egalitarian, largely government-financed health care sys-
tem means that these pressures and the cost containment measures 
they have prompted affect middle- and upper-class consumers and 
their providers as well as the poor and those who provide the poor with 
medical services.170 In the United States, by contrast, politically power-
ful middle- and upper-class consumers have, so far, been largely insu-
166 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 15. 
167 See id. While Evans and Law list this point only as an observation, it is exactly what one 
would expect from an analytic perspective. The interests of providers in provider reimbursement 
and perquisites is obviously more concentrated than that of any other constituency interested in 
health care costs. Diffusion of interest among the other constituencies will nearly always mean 
underinvestment, from the perspective of constituencies as social aggregates, by the individual 
members of the social aggregates, in defending those interests. 
168 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 15. 
169 See Canada Health and Social Transfer, supra note 95. 
170 See Iglehart I, supra note 137, at 203. 
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lated from the effects of government cutbacks by the extent of non-
governmental financing and by the open-ended Medicare entitlement. 
It is precisely the success that Canada has enjoyed in restraining 
costs, without compromising health outcomes,171 that has generated 
the outrage noted by the New York Times,172 as Dr. Steven Katz so acutely 
noted in his letter commenting on the Times' article. 173 The era when 
health care costs rose steadily at rates far in excess of rates of growth 
of the economy as a whole generated expectations among providers 
and consumers of health care that cannot be met now that that era 
has ended in Canada. 174 
Even within the constraints imposed by limiting health care spend-
ing to a constant percentage of GDP, the structure of the Canadian 
health care system permits further evolution of the health care delivery 
system that might increase consumer satisfaction without increasing 
costs. Although, as noted above, Evans and Law argue that public 
financing tended to arrest development of provider reimbursement at 
the fee-for-service stage,I75 I have argued above that the Canada Health 
Act in fact sanctions a broader array of health care delivery systems.176 
In particular, an HMO offering open access to a stated number of 
enrollees, without subscriber co-payments, by agreement with a provin-
cial government, appears not to violate the provisions of the Canada 
Health Act.I77 The more intensive management of care usual in an 
HMO should improve the overall efficiency of the Canadian health 
171 Set! CANADA'S HEALTH SYSTEM, POLICY AND CONSULTATION BRANCH, HEALTH CANADA 4-5 
(Aug. 1996); set! also DECO IN FIGURES, supplement to THE DECO OBSERVER, No. 200, 48-51 
aune/July 1996). 
172 Steven Jay Katz, M.D., Editorial, Don't Distort Flaws in Canada Health Care; Painful Price Tag, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,1996, at 08. 
mSee id. 
174This is a critical point of another excellent letter criticizing the DePalma article. Set! Earl 
Berger, Editorial, Don't Distort Flaws In Canada Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at 08. 
Mr. Berger, managing director of the Canada Health Monitor, also points out that, contrary to 
the article's claim that increasing numbers have sought medical services in the United States, the 
percentage of Canadians using services outside their own provinces has remained constant, at 
3%, since 1990, and that most of those who did seek services elsewhere did so in other Canadian 
provinces. See id. Further, Berger noted that the proportion of Canadians reporting a wait for 
specialist services remained constant at 15% between 1990 and 1994, while the percentage 
reporting long waits actually declined. See id. 
175 See EVANS & LAw, supra note 56, at 15; see also supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
176 Set! Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1983-1984 S.C. 273 (Can.); see also supra notes 79-91 and 
accompanying text. 
177Bruce Davis, Director General, Health Insurance Branch, Health Canada has cautiously 
endorsed this conclusion in an email to the author (March 13, 1997). He added these qualifica-
tions: there should be opportunities for exit, either at periodic times or by formal request; there 
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care system, and thus its cost-effectiveness. Further, Canadians could 
no doubt profitably employ many other techniques of "managed care" 
developed in the United States as a private sector response to escalating 
health care costs. The very different histories of health care financing 
in the United States and Canada have given each country an opportu-
nity to learn from the other. That opportunity should not be squan-
dered. 
III. SWITZERLAND l7S 
A. History and Government 
Switzerland is a country of four languages, German, French, Italian, 
and Romansh,l79 and two main religions, Protestant and Catholic. ISO 
The i:xistence of the Swiss Confederation is anomalous even by the 
would have to be provision for out-of-network emergency services; provisions to guard against 
HMOs targeting favorable risks would also be important. 
178 In response to a request from Michael J. Graetz, Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale 
Law School, addressed to the Federal Office of Social Insurance, M. Gross, lic. rer. pol., of the 
Health Economics Section of the Division of Medicine and Health Economics of the Federal 
Office of Social Insurance, in May 1994, provided Professor Graetz with extensive materials on 
the existing state of health insurance law in Switzerland. These materials included a variety of 
government initiatives aimed at reinforcing the social character of the Swiss system of health 
insurance and at reducing its costs. Professor Graetz was kind enough to share these materials 
with me. 
In March 1997, in response to a request from the author, Markus Moser, Associate Director of 
the Health and Accident Division, Federal Office of Social Insurance, provided a substantial 
corpus of additional material, both primary and secondary. As the many references to the 
materials received both from Mr. Gross and Mr. Moser below will attest, the information they 
provided was central to the discussion which follows. Further, I believe that the developments 
they chronicle are highly relevant to the debate over health care reform in the United States. I 
am deeply grateful to Professor Graetz, and to the Swiss authorities, especially to Messrs. Gross 
and Moser, for their invaluable contribution to this article. 
179 See Alfred Maurer, Switzerland, in PETER A. KOHLER, HANS F. ZACHER & MARTIN PART-
INGTON, THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 1881-1981: STUDIES OF GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT 
BRITAIN, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND 384 (1982); GEORG 'fHURER, FREE AND SWISS 12, 181 (R.P. 
Heller and E. Long trans., 1972). Romansh, though spoken by only 50,000 Swiss, located princi-
pally in the canton of Grisons, is a national language under the Swiss constitution, though not 
of the same rank as German, French, and Italian, which are official languages. See Maurer, supra, 
at 384; 'fHURER, supra, at 12, 181. 
ISO See Maurer, supra note 179, at 384. It seems odd, at least to me and perhaps to most 
Americans, to speak of Protestantism, firstly as if it were a coherent whole, and secondly as a 
"religion" different from Catholicism. Americans tend to think of Christianity as a religion and 
of its subdivisions as "denominations." See, e.g., the definitions of "Christianity," "denomination," 
"Catholicism" and "Protestantism" in WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY. However much 
we deplore, quite rightly, what religious and ethnic prejudice exists in the United States, viewed 
from the European perspective, Americans are, and have always been, remarkably tolerant, as 
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historical standards of fractious Europe. If Italian speakers to the south 
and German speakers to the north had achieved political unification 
before the second half of the nineteenth century, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that Switzerland would have been divided among Germany, 
Italy, and France. 
Switzerland traces its antecedents as an independent republic to the 
late Middle Ages, though it attained essentially its existing territorial 
extent only at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.181 The federation of the 
Swiss, despite their linguistic and religious differences, is largely the 
result of their own free choice, not the result of an association forced 
by some on others. It was only with the adoption of the Constitution 
of 1848, however, that Switzerland was transformed from a federation 
of sovereign states, the cantons, into a confederation where the can-
tons and the federal government shared the sovereignty of the state .182 
The current Swiss constitution is that of 1874, which strengthened 
the powers of the central government.183 The constitution of Switzer-
land, however, reserves to the cantons powers not explicitly delegated 
to the federal government. 184 The Swiss national legislature, the Na-
tional Assembly, consists of two houses, the National Council, with two 
hundred members elected nationally on the basis of proportional 
representation,185 and the State Council, with two members from each 
"full" canton and one member from each "half' canton. l86 In joint 
session, acting as the United National Assembly, the Swiss legislators 
elect the Federal Council, the executive power of the federal govern-
ment. 187 The Federal Council has·seven members, elected for terms of 
four years.188 One of these seven is each year designated Federal Presi-
dent, the Swiss head of government. 189 
The Swiss constitution provides for a remarkable degree of direct 
democracy through extensive powers of initiative and referendum. 190 
recent events in Bosnia serve all too sadly to remind us. Indeed, though I have no reason to 
doubt Swiss tolerance, see THURER, supra note 179, at 11-12, the last Swiss civil war, in 1847, was 
fought between Catholics and Protestants. See id. at 106-10. 
181 See THURER, supra note 179, at 23-34, 94. 
182 See id. at 113-14. 
18S See BV, CST., COST. FED. [Constitution] (Switz). 
184 See id. art. 3; Maurer, supra note 179, at 384. 
185 See THURER, supra note 179, at 166. 
186 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 385. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
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One hundred thousand signatures suffice to submit a proposal for 
constitutional revision to a national plebiscite. l9l Approval requires 
majorities both of the popular vote and of the outcomes by canton.192 
Federal laws and certain other decrees which the National 
Council and the State Council have approved are subject to 
facultative referendum. They must be submitted to the peo-
ple for acceptance or rejection, if this is requested at the time 
by 50,000 voters. Only [a] majority of the [popular vote] ... 
is decisive; a majority of the cantons ... is not needed.193 
There is no statutory power of initiative, which has resulted in inclu-
sion in the constitution of changes more appropriate to statutory 
revision. 194 
One of the seven federal councilors is head of the Department of 
the Interior, which is responsible for most social insurance programs.195 
One of its divisions, the Federal Office for Social Insurance, supervises 
social insurance programs, drafts new social insurance legislation, and 
is the court of appeal for the adjudication of certain complaints. 196 
The United National Assembly also elects the Federal Insurance 
Court in Lucerne. 197 
This acts as the federal court for social insurance as it repre-
sents the supreme judicial authority in the field of Swiss social 
insurance. While it was originally completely separate from 
the Federal Law Court, the legislature made the Insurance 
Court part of the Federal Law Court, although its organiza-
tion has remained entirely independent, with an amendment 
of 20 December 1968 to the Federal Law on the Organiza-
tion of Federal Administration of Justice .... The judges are 
elected separately by the National Assembly.198 
191 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 385. 
192 See id. 
19S See id. 
194 See id. at 386. 
195 See id. at 385. 
196 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 385. 
197 See id. 
19B/d. 
1998) HEALTH CARE REFORM 411 
B. Health Insurance 
Article 34 of the Constitution of 1874, still in force, authorized the 
federal government to regulate the employment of children and the 
working hours of adults in factories, and to protect workers against 
industrial accidents. 199 With this foundation, the National Assembly in 
1877, passed the Federal Law on Work in Factories, which survived a 
referendum challenge by 10,347 votes out of 352,061 cast.200 Following 
the example of the canton of Glarus, the Factory Act mandated a 
maximum work day of eleven hours, provided sixteen weeks of mater-
nity leave, raised the minimum age for child labor to fourteen, arid 
required that time for schooling be subtracted from the eleven hour 
maximum for children aged fourteen to sixteen.20l It authorized en-
forcement by government inspectors.202 It also established broad, but 
not universal, employer liability for workplace accidents.203 
Building on experience with application of the workplace accident 
liability provisions, and inspired by the pioneering German legislation 
on workers' compensation, the National Assembly proposed the fol-
lowing amendment to the Swiss constitution: 
In the course of legislation the federal government will estab-
lish sickness and accident insurance, taking existing sickness 
insurance into account. It can declare that membership is 
either universally compulsory or only compulsory for individ-
ual sections of the community.204 
The amendment was adopted by a margin of over three to one, pro-
viding the federal government for the first time with both a constitu-
tional foundation and a popular mandate for social insurance legisla-
tion.205 
Mter study of the German and Austrian health and accident insur-
ance systems, the National Assembly enacted in 1899 a system of health 
199 See id. at 396. 
200 See id. at 400. 
201 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 4O~1. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. The Factory Liability Law of 25 June 1881, confirmed the broad principles of 
employer liability, but restricted somewhat their application by establishing maximum awards 
regardless of damages and by urging consideration of employer solvency when making an award. 
See id. at 401. 
204ld. at 410. 
205 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 410. 
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and accident insurance compulsory for all employed persons over the 
age of fourteen with annual incomes less than 5,000 francs. 206 Despite 
endorsement by all political parties, the legislation was resoundingly 
rejected in a referendum on May 20, 1900, after opposition by the 
insurance industry: "The bill was said to represent the 'beginning of 
state Socialism' and was considered to be 'centralistic.'''207 
Proponents of social insurance were slow to regroup after so deci-
sive a rebuff. The eventual revision proposed uncoupling health insur-
ance from workers' compensation, providing only subsidies for private 
health insurance which met certain criteria while enacting once again 
a compulsory, state system of workers' compensation.208 The health 
insurance proposal did expand upon its foreign exemplars in one 
respect, however, in that it subsidized coverage for all Swiss citizens, 
not merely for employed persons.209 By a margin of 287,656 for to 
241,426 against, The Federal Law on Sickness and Accident Insurance 
of 13 June 1911 withstood a referendum challenge.21o 
C. Health Insurance Provisions of 13 June 1911 Act, as Effective Until 
31 December 1995 
The Health Insurance Provisions of 13 June 1911 Act promoted 
health insurance by granting premium subsidies to insureds enrolled 
in health insurance funds which the Federal Council had determined 
met the Act's requirements.211 The individual cantons had the right to 
make health insurance mandatory either for the population at large 
or for defined classes, and to create public insurance plans. The can-
tons were permitted to require employers to assure that employees 
subject to compulsory enrollment in plans paid their premiums, pre-
sumably through payroll deduction, but were prohibited from requir-
ing that the employers themselves contribute to the cost of the cover-
age.212 
206 See id. at 410-11. 
207Id. The analogies to insurance company opposition to the 1994 proposal of the Clinton 
administration for reform of health care financing in the United States are uncanny. See H.R. 
3600, 103d Congo (1993); S. 1757, 103d Congo (1993). Qoser attention to relevant foreign 
experience might have better prepared the Clinton administration to make its case with the 
public. 
208 See Maurer, supra note 179, at 412. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 LOI FiDERALE SUR L'ASSURANCE EN CAS DE MALADIE ET D'ACCIDENTS DU 13 JUIN 1911, RS 
832.10, art. 1 (Berne 1912) [hereinafter 13JUNE 1911 ACTJ. 
212 See id. art. 2. 
1998] HEALTH CARE REFORM 413 
Eligible organizations had to be adequately capitalized insurance 
companies, resident in Switzerland, conducting at least their health 
insurance business as mutual companies.213 The articles of incorpora-
tion could limit enrollment to members of particular occupations, 
religions or political parties,214 but the right actually to discriminate on 
these bases was sharply curtailed. While Article 5 stated that no plan 
could refuse enrollment on the basis of religion or membership in a 
political party to an applicant who does not meet the requirements of 
any other plan operating in his/her place of residence, Article 11 
appeared to make Article 5 superfluous, since it prohibited plans from 
excluding anyone for religious or political reasons.215 Article 6 prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of sex.216 
D. Portamlity 
Eligible plans had to assure portability of coverage from one plan to 
another with similar enrollment requirements.217 Additionally, these 
plans could not impose either age, pre-existing conditions or transfer 
fee requirements on a previously enrolled person who wished to trans-
fer coverage.218 A transferee had to receive coverage at the same price 
as an enrollee of his/her same attained age. 219 
E. Minimum Benefits 
Plans had to provide their members with health care, including 
drugs, or with a minimum total disability benefit of one Swiss franc per 
day.220 The maximum probationary period for eligibility for a disability 
benefit was three months.221 Health care benefits had to be paid from 
the beginning of a qualifying illness, and a disability benefit no later 
than from the third day after the beginning of the disability.222 The 
maximum annual disability benefit could be no less than 180 days.223 
m See id. art. 3, § 3. 
214 See id. art. 3. Further, Article 28 prohibits the use of insurer capital in non-insurance 
ventures. See id. art. 28. 
m See id. arts. 5, 11. 
216 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 6. 
217 See id. arts. 7-10. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. art. 12. 
221 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 13. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
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Plans could require a 25% copayment toward health care costs if their 
maximum benefit period was at least 266 days per year.224 
Pregnancy had to be treated as equivalent to an illness if the insured 
had been a member for at least nine months.225 A disability benefit for 
pregnancy had to last at least six weeks, though if the insured con tin-
ued to work, her wages could offset the benefit.226 Mothers still nursing 
four weeks after the expiration of their disability benefit were entitled 
to an additional payment of at least 20 francs. 227 
F. Choice of Physicians 
Article 15 guaranteed an insured a choice among the physicians 
practicing in his or her area.228 Plans could limit that right if they were 
able to negotiate fee arrangements with physicians. Any physician 
practicing in the plan's area for at least a year had to be free to join 
the "network" if he or she was willing to accept the negotiated fees. 229 
The fees had to be the same for every member of a plan.230 If plans 
were unable to negotiate fees, they could substitute for up to a year a 
reimbursement set by the cantonal government at the average medical 
fee. 
If hospitalization was required, the plans were free to entrust the 
care of their insureds to the hospital's staff.231 The plans could em-
ploy "physician reviewers" to oversee the medical care of their in-
sureds,m and were not required to pay either for medically unneces-
sary treatment or for unprescribed drugs.233 The Act prohibited over-
insurance.234 
G. Pharmaceuticals 
Article 19 established rules for pharmacists corresponding to those 
of Articles 15-17 for physicians.235 
224 See id. 
225 See id. art. 14. 
226 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 14. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. art. 15. 
229 See id. art. 16. 
250 See id. art. 23. 
251 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 17. 
252 See id. art. 18. 
255 See id. art. 23. 
254 See id. art. 26. 
255 See id. arts. 19, 15-17. 
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H. Health Care Charges 
Mter consultation with health insurance plans and medical and 
pharmacists' associations, cantonal governments had the responsibility 
of setting the range of allowable fees for all medical services and 
pharmaceuticals.236 In setting these rates, the Act mandated that the 
cantonal authorities consider local circumstances and the rates the 
health plans had been able to negotiate.237 Negotiated rates had to 
conform to the cantonal fee schedule.238 
I. Disputes Between Providers and Plans 
Article 25 stated that cantonal governments would develop both an 
arbitration mechanism and procedures.239 The arbitration procedures 
had to accord equal representation to the disputing parties.240 The 
arbitration authorities resolved disputes between plans and providers, 
including a disagreement over a plan's decision to disqualify a provider 
for reasons of personal or professional misconduct from providing 
services to its members.241 
J. Other Provisions Affecting the Status of Plans 
Private law disputes among plans, between plans and their members, 
or between plans and third persons, were subject to the normal legal 
process, unless cantonal law or provisions of plan governance provided 
otherwise.242 Plans were exempt from taxes, except those on capital not 
deployed in the business of insurance.243 Plans had annually to com-
pute and report to the Federal Council the results of their opera-
tions.244 The Federal Council could assess penalties against plans not 
complying with the Act, including withdrawal of plan qualification as 
a last resort.245 Plans could voluntarily renounce their qualification.246 
236 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 22. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
259 See id. art. 25. 
240 See id. 
241 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 24. 
242 See id. art. 30. 
243 See id. art. 3l. 
244 See id. art. 32. 
245 See id. art. 33. 
246 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 34. 
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K Subsidies 
For health care policies with no disability benefit, or for those with 
only a disability benefit of at least one franc a day, the Act provided a 
premium subsidy of 3.5 francs for children under fourteen and adult 
men and 4 francs for adult women.247 Ifa policy provided both benefits, 
it received a subsidy of 5 francs. 248 The subsidies were increased by 
one-half franc for plans which provided health care benefits for 360 
days in a period of 540 consecutive days.249 The federal government 
provided an additional subsidy of 20 francs for each pregnancy, in-
creased to 40 francs if the mother qualified for the additional nursing 
benefit.250 Federal subsidies could not exceed half the total income of 
a plan, and only a single subsidy was payable per individual.251 
Additional subsidies were provided to assist cantonal and local gov-
ernments in providing health care in thinly populated, medically un-
derserved areas.252 If cantonal or local governments made health insur-
ance obligatory, in general or for particular classes of the population, 
and if they subsidized the cost of coverage for the poor, the federal 
government matched one-third of their expenditures.25!l 
In an illustration of permitted differences in premiums, Kurt Krum-
biegel hypothesizes a premium of eight tenths of a franc per month 
for the minimum permitted disability benefit of one franc per day.254 
If the example is realistic, which seems plausible in light of the restric-
tion on subsidies in Article 36, the subsidy for a minimum benefit plan 
was nearly 40% of its total COSt.255 If a cantonal government required 
health insurance coverage, and subsidized 100% for the poor the 
individual contribution otherwise required, the operation of Article 
38 would have raised the level of federal subsidy to 60% (40% + 
1/3(100% - 40%) = 60%).256 
247 See ill. art. 36. 
248 See id. 
249 See id. This compares to the minimum benefit of 180 days out of 360 days. See id. 
250 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
251 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, art. 36. 
252 See ill. art. 37. 
25~ See id. art. 38. 
254 KURT KRUMBIEGEL, DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE SOZIALVERSICHERUNG 14 (1913). 
255 See id. 
256 See id. 
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L. Amendment of 13 March 1964 257 
The only major amendment of the 1911 Act prior to its replacement 
in 1994 occurred in 1964.258 The amendment adapted the principles 
of the earlier law to the realities of modern insurance and medical cost 
inflation, but left unchanged its basic principles.259 Article 5, new Sec-
tions 3 and 4 prohibited the funds from refusing to accept a member 
for reasons of ill health or pregnancy.260 However, the funds could en-
force pre-existing conditions restrictions for at most five years after en-
rollment.26! A new Article 5, Part II'recognized the eligibility of group 
insurance programs for subsidy.262 Persons insured under a group con-
tract had to have the right to convert to an individual policy if their 
eligibility for group insurance ended. 263 
Health insurance premiums could vary by enrollment age, sex,264 
area, and, as permitted by regulation, family statuS.265 Article 12, Part 
II spelled out with somewhat greater specificity the health care benefits 
required, though they remained very general.266 The principle change 
was that hospital and disability (and health spa!) benefits had to last 
for at least 720 out of900 consecutive days.267 Benefits for confinement 
in a tuberculosis sanitorium had to be available for 1800 days out of 
seven consecutive years.268 Pregnancy had to be treated as the equiva-
lent of an illness, if the insured had been a fund member for at least 
270 days without an interruption of more than three months. 269 Mid-
wifery and pre-natal and post-natal care had to be included as ben-
257 Amendment to 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, Lm FEDERALE DU 13 MARS 1964 
MODIFIANT LE PREMIER TITRE DE LA LOI SUR L'ASSURANCE EN CAS DE MALADIE ET D'ACCIDENTS, 
RO 1964 965 [hereinafter 1964 Amendment]. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. art. 5, §§ 3, 4. 
261 See id. 
262 See 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 5, pt. II. 
263 See id. 
264However, cash sickness pay premiums cannot vary by sex. See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 
211, art. 5, amended by 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 12, pt. II. 
265 See id. art. 6, pt. II. 
266 See id. art. 12, pt. II. 
267 See id. pt. III. 
268 See id. 
269 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, amended by 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 
14. 
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efits.270 Home delivery had to be an option for the insured.271 The 
nursing benefit was increased to 50 francs. 272 
The funds were permitted to impose deductibles and copayments, 
which could not vary by sex and which could not be higher in cases of 
hospitalization, tuberculosis, spa cures or pregnancy.273 The funds were 
permitted to charge a fee for providing copies of medical records.274 
The expected value of the deductible could not exceed a tenth of the 
cost of the health care coverage provided. 275 
Article 19, Part II extended mandatory freedom of choice on the 
part of the insured to hospitals.276 If the insured chose a hospital with 
which the fund did not have a provider contract, however, the fund's 
payment could be limited to the rate at the hospital nearest the resi-
dence of the insured with which it did have a contract.277 Freedom of 
choice extended also to approved tuberculosis sanitoriums and health 
spas.278 
In addition, Article 21, Sections 4 through 6 imposed on the funds 
the requirement of paying for chiropractors, midwives and other 
health care professionals practicing within the scope of their licenses.279 
Article 22 permitted the funds to vary the rate of payment to physi-
cians by the economic status of the insured.280 Where payment rates 
varied, the premium rates had to vary as well.281 The Amendment 
provided a more specific framework for the fixing of fees than formerly 
existed, which in theory gave the cantonal authorities a significant 
role.282 Article 23 restricted practitioners to medical treatment in the 
interests of the insured which are necessary and medically recog-
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 See id. 
27g See id. pt. II. 
274 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, amended 1Ty 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 
14, pt. II. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. art. 19, pt. II. 
277 See id. 
278 See id. 
279 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, amended 1Ty 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 
21, §§ 4-6. 
280 See id. art. 22. 
281 See id. I suppose, without certainty, that this reflects existing cantonal programs for providing 
care to the indigent. 
282 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, amended 1Ty 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, 
pts. II-V, art. 73, pt. II. 
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nized.283 Amendment of Article 35 revised the calculation of the federal 
subsidy. 284 The basic rates of contribution were 10% for adult men, 35% 
for adult women, and 30% for children fifteen years of age and under. 
There were additional subsidies for pregnancy and tuberculosis.285 In 
a report as recent as February of 1994, the Swiss Office of Social 
Insurance described the law of 1911, as revised in 1964, as essentially 
the law still in force. 286 Despite a plethora of proposals, the degree of 
consensus necessary for reform given the nature of Swiss government 
had not yet materialized.287 
M. Subsequent Piecemeal Reforms 
The relentless increase in medical costs, which has been more pro-
nounced in Switzerland than anywhere else in Europe, led to a series 
of temporary palliatives while the Swiss struggled to find the high level 
of consensus needed for fundamental reform. For example, in 1990, 
the Federal Council raised the standard deductible to 150 francs,288 and 
in 1992 extended the application of deductibles and daily copayments 
(in the place of co-insurance) to hospitalization.289 Earlier, in 1986, the 
Federal Council had permitted insurers to offer optional higher de-
ductibles in exchange for lower premiums.290 
283 1 equate this to be the ban in the United States on experimental treatment. See 13JUNE 1911 
ACT, supra note 211, amended by 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, art. 23. 
284 See id. art. 35. 
285 See id. arts. 36, 37. 
286 Swiss Reform, supra note 73. 
287 [d. In 1974, the popular and cantonal votes rejected both a popular initiative and a counter-
proposal by the federal government. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text. The initiative 
would have made health insurance obligatory and created a subsidized disability insurance. See 
Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 6. The Federal Council's counter-proposal would have made 
emergency coverage and disability insurance for workers obligatory. See id. However, Parliament 
proposed a quite different program, which would have maintained a wholly voluntary system of 
participation while introducing compulsory contributions for health insurance. See id. It would 
have also made disability insurance mandatory for workers. See id. 
In 1987, the voters rejected a proposal that abandoned compulsory disability insurance for 
workers and that would merely have mandated a maternity benefit. See id. at 6. 
288 See Ordonnance V sur l'assurance-maladie concernant la reconnaissance des caisse-maladies 
et des federations de reassurance, ainsi que leur securite financiere, du 2 fevrier 1965 (as 
amended) [hereinafter Ordonnance V] in AsSURANCE-MALADIE/ LOI FEDERALE/ ARRETES 
FEDERAUX/ DISPOSITIONS D'ExECUTION/ INDEX ALPHABETIQUE, ETAT AU 1ER JANVIER 1994, 
OFFICE FEDERAL DES ASSURANCES SOCIALES 95, 106 (1994) [hereinafter SWISS HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE]. 
289 See id.; Arrete federal sur des mesures temporaires contre Ie rencherissement de l'assurance-
maladie, du 9 octobre 1992, in SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 48-49. 
290 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 106. 
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In 1989, the Federal Council authorized a six-year experiment with 
HMOs.291 Permitting restrictions on provider choice was a radical de-
parture for the Swiss, who, as we have seen, enshrined freedom of 
provider choice in their health care financing legislation.292 The clear 
purpose of this experiment was to explore the possibility that manage-
ment of health care delivery would reduce the demand for health care 
services.293 The same measure permitted insurers to reduce premiums, 
from an initially higher base, for insureds who filed no claims through-
out the course of a calendar year. 294 
N. Protecting Stability and Maintaining Social Solidarity 
The Swiss adopted several measures which identified protecting 
"solidarity" as their primary objective.295 For example, a December 13, 
1991, decree of the Swiss Federal Assembly has the title "Federal De-
cree on Temporary Measures to Protect Solidarity [contre la desolidar-
isation] in Health Insurance."296 This decree enacted inter-fund subsi-
dies, transferring money from funds with lower than average 
enrollments of women and the aged to funds with higher than aver-
age enrollments of members of these groupS.297 This measure indeed 
crossed an important line between a program of subsidy for voluntary 
insurance and a true program of social insurance. 
Such a measure appears to have been the minimum necessary to 
maintain coverage of the population at high levels. Otherwise, funds 
that succeeded in enrolling healthier than average segments of the 
community could assure them lower premiums, while those excluded, 
whether by marketing tactics or otherwise, might gradually find that 
they could no longer afford the cost of their higher-priced coverage. 
In the language of American insurers, this phenomenon is called the 
"anti-selection death spiral." 
291 See Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 22. 
m See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
29~ See Swi~ Reform, supra note 73, at 22. 
294 See id. at 23. This is a reform of dubious soundness. It has the effect of discouraging the use 
of low-cost preventive care and of early diagnosis, and that, in terms of overall cost-effectiveness, 
creates perverse incentives. 
295 See, e.g., SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 46. 
296 See id. All translations from the French of the original are my own. I have chosen to render 
"contre la desolidarisation" "protect solidarity" rather than to attempt to make good English out 
of the word "desolidarisation." 
297 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 46. 
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Another important step in the direction of a true social insurance 
program taken by the decree was the promotion of income-related 
cantonal subsidies.298 The decree made available an additional 100 
million francs to cantons which reduced health insurance premiums 
according to the economic need of their inhabitants.299 In a November 
13, 1991, modification to the regulation governing group health insur-
ance promulgated in 1964, the Federal Council established a minimum 
premium for group health insurance.3OO This minimum was set at the 
weighted average premium for individually insured persons in the 
working adult category, less twenty-five percent.30l This action had the 
effect of subsidizing individual insureds at the expense of group in-
sureds.302 
In modifications made December 3, 1990, to premium rating regu-
lations, the Swiss Federal Council limited premiums for the highest age 
group to double those for working-age adults.303 This subsidy from 
young to old also strengthened the social insurance character of the 
Swiss system. Finally, as part of a decree generally directed against price 
inflation, the federal government prohibited premium differences by 
sex. 304 This also strengthened the social insurance character of the 
system; since it constituted a subsidy from men to women. 
o. Price Controls 
The Swiss deservedly have the reputation of being capitalists par 
excellence. The repeated rejection in referenda,305 prior to that held 
December 4, 1994, by the Swiss electorate even of modest efforts by 
the federal government to increase the role of government in manag-
. ing health care financing itself testifies to the deep Swiss attachment 
to free markets. Yet, as will be addressed below, the crisis precipitated 
298 See id. at 46-47. 
299 See id. In order to qualify, the cantons also had to match the federal contribution, in ratios 
ranging from three to one to one to one, depending on their individual financial situations. 
~oo See Ordonnance II sur l'assurance-maladie du 22 decembre 1964 concernant l'assurance 
collective pratiquee par les caisses-maladie reconnues par la Confederation, art. 13a [hereinafter 
Ordonnance II], in SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 75. 
~Ol See id. 
~02 See id. 
~o~ See id. § 3bis; Ordonnance V, art. 17, § 2, in SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 
101. 
~04 See Arrete federal sur des mesures temporaires contre Ie rencherissement de l'assurance-
maladie, art. 4, in SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 49. 
~05 See id. 
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by rising health care costs led even the Swiss to one of the most extreme 
forms of government intervention, price controls. 
As a first, rather mild, step, as part of the decree discussed above 
aimed generally at intra-system stability,3OO the government reduced 
federal subsidies for funds for which the rate of increase in overhead 
costs exceeded the rate of increase in input costs.307 The "Federal 
Decree on Temporary Measures against Health Insurance Price Infla-
tion"308 froze rates for ambulatory care for 1993, at the levels which 
existed on June 30,1992. Rates for pharmaceuticals were frozen at the 
level which existed on September 15, 1992.309 The decree permitted an 
increase in rates for 1994 if the increase in total costs310 of treatment 
per insured did not exceed the rate of increase in the Swiss Consumer 
Price Index by more than one-third. Article 2 of the Decree limited 
increases in hospital costs to the rates of inflation in the general 
economy to which they corresponded.311 Charges for increases in labor 
costs were limited to the rate of increase in national wages, and for 
other costs to the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index.312 
In addition to an attempt to control input costs, Articles 5 and 6 of 
the decree imposed direct controls on premium rates themselves.313 A 
ceiling was imposed on premium rates. 314 The ceiling, calculated by 
canton, was equal to the average premium for working adults for the 
preceding year increased by the rate of increase in the Consumer Price 
Index multiplied by 1.8.315 
306 See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text; Federal Decree on Temporary Measures to 
Protect Solidarity in Health Insurance of 13 December 1991, in SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra 
note 288, at 46. 
307 See id. art 2. 
308 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288 at 48. 
309 See itl. at 48. Article 1, Section 2 permitted modest increases in cases where cost increases 
from 1990 to 1992, had been relatively low. See id. 
510 Since the total cost per insured for a category of medical service is the product of the average 
number of services in the category per insured and the average price per service, this requirement 
had the effect of constraining prices not only for price inflation, but for utilization increases as 
well. 
311 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 49. 
312 See itl. 
m See itl. at 16. 
514 See itl. 
515 See itl. at 49-50. For example, if the overall increase in the CPI was 3.0%, the premium would 
be permitted to increase by 5.4% (3.0% x 1.8 equals 5.4%). 
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P. Percentage of Persons Insured 
This system ofincentives and voluntary insurance provided coverage 
for 96% of the Swiss population.316 Additionally, 2% of the Swiss popu-
lation had insurance which did not qualifY for the federal subsidy.317 
Only 2% of the population were uninsured.318 
Q. Fundamental Reform 
The important measures just discussed, aiming at promoting social 
solidarity (or system stability, depending on one's perspective) and 
combating health care cost inflation, were intended to be tempo-
rary, in order to give the government breathing room to develop a 
fundamental reform of the Swiss health care financing system.319 On 
March 18, 1994, the National Assembly repealed the basic law of June 
13, 1911, and enacted a new system of social health insurance in its 
place.32o The law defines social health insurance to consist of compul-
sory medical benefits insurance and voluntary disability income insur-
ance.321 The entry into effect of the legislation was dependent on its 
approval by the voters in a referendum,322 which took place on Decem-
ber 4, 1994. By the very narrow margin of 51.8% to 48.2%,323 the Swiss 
electorate finally approved major modifications to the health care 
financing system. The law provides Federal subsidies to the cantons for 
medical benefits, but not for disability income.324 Most significant po-
litically, the Swiss statute, "Loi federale sur l'assurance-maladie" (here-
inafter LAMal), requires that the cantons use Federal subsidies only to 
316 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 500, tbi. A.1. 
317 See id. 
318 See id. 
319 See Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 24. 
320 SeeLoi federale sur l'assurance-maladie (LAMal) du 18 mars 1994, (Etat Ie ler juillet 1995) 
in AsSURANCE MALADlE, OFFICE FEDERAL DES lMPRIMES ET DU MATERIEL (Bern 1996) [hereinaf-
ter LAMal]. 
321 See id. art. 1, § 1. The basic scope of the new legislation resembles that of the initiative 
rejected in 1974. See supra note 286. 
322 See LAMa 1 , supra note 320, art. 107. 
323 Fax from the Swiss Embassy to the author received June 27,1995. 
324 See LAMal, supra note 320, arts. 60 § I, 65, 66 § I, 75 § I, 106 §§ I, 2. Although LAMal 
Article 60, Section I, discussing medical benefits insurance, and LA.\:Ial Article 75, Section 1, 
discussing disability income insurance, use the same language to describe their financing as a 
system of sharing of expenses, Article 66 in the medical benefits section of the Act (Title 2) 
explicitly provides for federal and cantonal subsidies. Article 65 states that these subsidies are to 
used to reduce premiums for the economically disadvantaged. Article 106, Section 1 sets the level 
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subsidize premiums for the poor.325 LAMal repealed a major middle 
class entitlement, a remarkable achievement with unfortunately pre-
dictable political results.326 
We are interested principally in the medical benefits component of 
social health insurance. Though, as one would expect, the new system 
has substantial continuity with the old one, it places a far greater 
emphasis on cost containment and is in fact, as it describes itself in 
name,327 a program of social insurance instead of a program of govern-
ment subsidies to private, voluntary insurance. The greatest conceptual 
difference is that medical insurance is compulsory. Anyone born or 
taking up residence in Switzerland must acquire health insurance 
within three months of birth or of taking up domicile in Switzerland.328 
In making the case for a movement from a voluntary to a compulsory 
system, the Swiss authorities accurately (and astutely!) stressed that 
required participation is a necessary complement to other measures 
intended to strengthen the social character of Swiss health insurance.329 
Since the law project had as its objective to eliminate the flaws 
of the existing system, the principal component of the project 
is to reinforce social solidarity. While the project continues 
per capita premiums regardless of the financial position of 
the insured, it prohibits maximum ages of entry, supplemen-
tal morbidity reserves, premium differences by sex or age of 
entry as well as special premiums for group insurance con-
tracts. Certain measures are intended to reduce premium 
differences [among insurance carriers]: insureds' complete 
freedom of choice of carriers (each insured must have the 
right freely to choose his initial carrier and then to change 
carriers), as well as risk adjustment among carriers for a 
period of ten years, [means] that the risk characteristics of a 
carrier's insured population will not play a major role in 
of federal subsidies for the first four years the new law is in effect. Article 106, Section 2 sets the 
level of the required matching cantonal matching contribution for those years. There is no 
provision for subsidies for the voluntary disability income insurance. 
325 See id. art. 66. 
326 See infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text. 
327 See lAMa1, supra note 320, art. 1. lAMa1 Artcile 1 states: ''This law regulates social health 
insurance. [Social health insurance] includes obligatory medical insurance and optional disability 
insurance." [d. 
328 See id. art. 3, § 1. Article 92 makes avoidance of the insurance mandate by misrepresentation 
a crime punishable by a fine or up to six months imprisonment. See id. art. 92. 
329 See Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 29. 
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determining premiums. These measures aimed at reinforcing 
solidarity make compulsory insurance necessary. In effect, com-
plete freedom of choice of carriers can only be achieved 
within a structure of mandatory insurance, since supplemen-
tary morbidity reserves and premium rating by age are nec-
essary elements of a system of voluntary insurance. The intro-
duction of mandatory insurance is thus [only] a means of 
achieving the unchanged objective, which is to assure [social] 
solidarity.330 
R. Premium Rating 
425 
Given the high degree of participation in the voluntary program, 
the greatest practical difference is that the new law sharply curtails 
premium rating. Article 61 permits insurers to vary premiums only by 
area, with a maximum of three area rates per canton.331 Insurers must 
charge a lower rate for children aged 18 or less, which they may extend 
to age 25 for students.332 Otherwise, premiums must be equal for all 
insureds,333 and premium rates must be approved by the Federal Coun-
ci1.334 
330Id. (emphisis added). Advocates of American health care reform including universal cover-
age could be excused for wishing that the Swiss Office of Social Insurance had managed the 
campaign on its behalf instead of the Clinton administration. American advocates of universal 
coverage have been slow to point out that without it insurance market reforms simply cannot 
work, as the quotation cited quite rightly insists. See id. at 29. If participation is voluntary, the 
choice whether or not to participate is open to anti-selection, on the grounds of health status if 
nothing else. However, it is almost certain that any package of reforms that could pass Congress 
would prohibit premium rating by sex. This creates a considerable additional incentive for males 
of every age not to participate. For example, health care costs for females under 30 years of age 
are three times higher than for males within this same age group. An age-, but not sex-, specific 
premium would cost a male under thirty years of age more than twice his expected medical costs. 
Telephone Interview with John Bohon, Actuary, Aetna US Healthcare, Blue Bell, Pennsylvania 
(February 12, 1998) (citing statistics based on more than one million member months of HMO 
data.). In a voluntary system, especially one that guarantees the right of later entry, and that 
continues to provide some uncompensated care, the rational choice for the average male under 
30 years of age is not to participate. This will of course trigger an anti-selection spiral that will 
destroy the under 30 voluntary market. 
Laura Tyson, quoted in Clinton Insists He Won't Retreat on Coverage for Al~ N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 
1994, at B9, did roughly outline these objections to market reforms without compulsory insur-
ance. 
331 See LAc\1a1, supra note 320, art. 61, § 2. 
332 See id. § 3. 
m See id. § l. 
334 See id. § 4. 
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As the analysis above suggests,335 the fewer the rating categories 
permitted, the more the insurance program is social in nature. Equal 
premium rates for all insureds means that the healthy subsidize the 
sick, the young subsidize the old, and men subsidize women. 
Article 7, Section 1 permits insureds to change insurers at will, with 
three months notice.336 In the case of a premium increase, insureds 
may change insurers with one month's notice.337 These provisions will 
certainly increase the importance of low premiums to the survival of an 
insurance fund, and almost certainly prefigure consolidation among 
medical benefits insurers.338 
S. Guaranty Fund 
Article 18 creates a national insurance guaranty fund to assure pay-
ment of the obligations of insolvent insurers and to assume other 
duties delegated to it by the Federal Councip39 Insurer payments fund 
insolvency obligations,34o while the Federal Council determines the 
funding of the duties it delegates.341 
T. Preventive Medicine 
Article 19, Section 1 makes the promotion of preventive medicine 
an insurer obligation.342 The cantons and the insurers collectively, or, 
if they fail to act, the Federal Council, will create an agency for this 
purpose.343 Its board of governors will contain members representing 
the numerous constituencies affected by health care policy.344 Part of 
335 See supra notes 294-303. 
3~ See LAMa1, supra note 320, art. 7, § l. 
337 The insureds notification window begins on the last day of the month in which the insured 
receives the insurer's notification of the premium increase. See id. § 2. 
3~ Funds must consolidate until the cost profiles of the remaining funds are the same. If they 
do not consolidate, the more expensive funds will lose members to the less expensive funds, which 
will likely make them more expensive still, due to lost economies of scale. Similar costs will require 
similar risk pools, which will in itself require groups large enough to track overall population 
statistics. See Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 7. Small medical cost differentials can be overcome 
by offsetting expense efficiencies. See id. In a country as small as Switzerland, I would guess that 
no more than five or six funds per area would ultimately survive, compared to the approximately 
two hundred in existence in 1994. See id. 
SS9 See LAMa1, supra note 320, art. 18, §§ 1-3. 
340 See id. art. 18, § 5. 
341 See id. § 6. 
342 See id. art. 19, § l. 
343 See id. §§ 2, 3. 
344 See LAMa1, supra note 320, art. 19, §§ 2, 3. 
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the premium for medical benefits insurance will be used to support 
this preventive medicine agency.345 
IV. COST CONTAINMENT 
A. Policy 
The new law has many provisions aimed at cost containment. Article 
22 limits insurer expenses to those necessary for economical manage-
ment346 and subjects them to the oversight of the Federal Council, 
including, if necessary, restraints on salaries and prices.347 Article 32, 
Section 1 mandates that treatments reimbursed have been provided as 
economically as possible and that they be proved effective by scientific 
analysis. 348 Article 33 specifically delegates to the Federal Council the 
designation of procedures not eligible for reimbursement.349 It also 
delegates to the Council the determination of how to reimburse for 
experimental treatments.350 Article 39 imposes a cantonal "certificate 
of need" obligation on inpatient facilities. 351 Although Article 41, Sec-
tion 1 reaffirms commitment to an insured's free choice of provider, 
Section 3 of the same Article permits insurers to offer limits on choice 
in exchange for lower premiums. 352 
B. Fees 
As under the old law, provider prices are determined by negotiation 
between providers and insurers. 353 However, both the negotiators and 
the public authorities with oversight responsibility are urged to bear 
in mind that, while the quality of care should be high, its cost should 
345 See id. art. 20, § 1. 
346 See id. 
347 See id. § 2. 
348 See id., art. 32, § 1. This is a very stern test which will almost certainly be impossible to 
enforce. Truly scientific tests require control groups. Medical ethics and public opinion prohibits 
leaving some sick persons untreated as a way of determining the cost-effectiveness of treatment. 
However, if what the law suggests is that any new treatments must be proved cost-effective 
compared to existing therapies before they will be reimbursed by social insurance, it could be 
important in reducing costs. 
349 See lAMa1, supra note 320, art. 33, §§ 1, 2. 
350 See id. § 3. 
351 See id. art. 39, § 1 (d). 
352 This makes permanent the experiment with alternate delivery mechanisms discussed above. 
See supra text accompanying notes 287-92. 
353 See lAMa1, supra note 320, art. 43, § 3. 
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be as low as possible.354 The law assigns to the Federal Council the 
responsibility of establishing procedures for setting fees. 355 
Article 46 prohibits a variety of provider arrangements that could 
have the effect of artificially inflating fees. 356 For example, Article 46 
prohibits separate contracts and exclusivity clauses, agreements that 
would violate U.S. anti-trust law.357 It also subjects fee schedule agree-
ments to the approval of cantonal or federal authorities, as their area 
of application warrants.358 
Article 49 requires hospitals and insurers to negotiate reimburse-
men t contracts. 359 It limits charges to insurers for use of public hospitals 
to 50% of the costs of care for those hospitals, where cost of care 
excludes the costs of investment, research, and overcapacity.360 
C. Other Provisions 
Providers who accept any remuneration from the social medical 
benefits program must accept it as payment in full; no balance billing 
is permitted.361 A physician who does not participate in the social 
insurance program must so inform an insured patient before providing 
any treatment.362 The law appears to anticipate substantial provider 
resistance. If the refusal of providers to participate in the social medical 
benefits program jeopardizes adequate treatment of those insured by 
it, Article 45 authorizes the cantonal authorities to take whatever action 
necessary. 
D. Other Cost Containment Measures 
Article 51 permits cantons, after consulting with providers, to impose 
a global budget as a way of controlling in-patient costs.363 Article 54 
permits insurers to insist upon a global budget for hospitalization if 
the rate of increase in hospitalization costs in the canton has exceeded 
the national average.364 Article 55 permits the appropriate authorities 
554 See id. § 6. 
555 See id. §§ 7. 
556 See id. art. 46, § 3. 
557 See id. 
558 See LAMal, supra note 320, art. 46, § 3. 
559 See id. art. 49 
560 See id. 
561 See id. art. 44, § 1. 
562 See id. § 2. 
565 See LAMal, supra note 320, art. 51. 
564 See id. art. 54. 
1998] HEALTII CARE REFORM 429 
to freeze prices within a segment of the health care industry when cost 
increases have grown at twice the rate of the general increase in wages 
and prices.365 The freeze lasts until the rate of growth in the affected 
segmen t has declined to no more than half that of the general increase 
in wages and salaries.366 
E. Role of Government 
In default of a negotiated agreement, the cantonal authorities can 
unilaterally decree a schedule after consulting with interested par-
ties.367 If negotiators cannot reach agreement when renegotiating an 
existing fee schedule, the cantonal authorities can extend the old 
schedule for one year.368 If at the end of that period, an agreement has 
still not been reached, the canton can, as in default of an initial 
agreement, promulgate a schedule after consultation with interested 
parties.369 
Article 53370 provides a right of appeal to the Federal Council from 
decisions of cantonal governments about: (1) the eligibility of hospitals 
for reimbursement by compulsory health insurance (Article 39) ;371 (2) 
actions to assure health care access (Article 45);372 (3) certification of 
fee schedules (Article 46, Section 4) ;373 (4) imposition of a fee schedule 
when providers and insurers fail to negotiate one (Article 47) ;374 (5) 
establishment of fee minimums and maximums (Article 48, Sections 1 
to 3);375 (6) adjudication of appropriateness of hospital charges (Article 
49, Section 7) ;376 (7) establishment of a global budget for hospitals 
(Article 51);377 (8) adjudication ofa demand from insurers for a global 
365 See id. art. 55. 
366 See id. Of course, utilization increases can cause costs to rise in a given health care segment 
even when unit prices stay the same. For example, if the cost of the average prescription stays 
constant at $30 per prescription, but the average number of prescriptions per insured person 
rises from four to four and one-half, the cost per person for prescription drugs rises from $120 
to $135. 
367 See id. art. 47, § 1. 
368 See lAMa1, supra note 320, art. 47, § 3. 
369 See id. 
370 See id. art. 53. 
371 See id. art. 39. 
372 See id. art. 45. 
373 See lAMa1, supra note 320, art. 46, § 4. 
374 See id. art. 47. 
375 See id. art. 48, §§ 1-3. 
376 See id. art. 49, § 7. 
377 See id. art. 51. 
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budget for hospitals (Article 54) ;378 and (9) installation of price con-
trols (Article 55).379 Other than those changes, the new proposal 
strongly resembles the law of June 13, 1911, which it replaces. 
F. Trends in Health Care Costs and Financing 
Nowhere, except in the United States, has the pressure exerted by 
the inexorable rise in health care costs been as great as in Switzerland. 
From 1985 to 1995, growth in health care spending outpaced growth 
in gross domestic product by 22%.380 By 1994, the Swiss had achieved 
the dubious distinction of attaining second place, surpassed only by 
the United States, both with respect to the percentage of their GNP 
devoted to health care, 9.9%,381 as well as with respect to per capita 
costs.382 
While costs themselves continued to climb, the government's share 
of health care costs fell. 383 I theorized above that the proportion of 
health care costs financed by the state was 40% or higher on introduc-
tion of premium subsidies in 191J.384 The 1964 amendments to the 13 
June 1911 Act set the level of subsidy at 10% for adult men, 35% for 
adult women, and 30% for children fifteen years old and under.385 
Economic recession and spiraling medical inflation, even before the 
most recent surge in costs, had led the Swiss government to abandon 
the percentage contribution scheme adopted in 1964.386 Per capita 
contributions were frozen in 1979,387 reduced 5% in 1981,388 and elimi-
nated, for middle-class recipients, by LAMal. According to J. Matthias 
Grafv. d. Schulenberg, in 1981, federal subsidies amounted to 19% of 
378 See lAMa 1 , supra note 320, art. 54. 
379 See id. art. 55. 
380 Les couts de la santi depassent la croissance economique, 96:6 CAMS ACTUEL 89, 90. CAMS 
ACTUEL is a publication of the Concordat of Swiss Health Insurers. All the articles from CAMS 
ACTUEL from which I quote were among the materials provided to me by Markus Moser. See supra 
note 178. 
381 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
382 Depenses de sante: la Suisse en deuxiime position, 96:9 CAMS ACTUEL 130. 
383 See WILLIAM A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE 189 (1991);]. MATTHIAS GRAY V. 
D. SCHULENBERG, DEREGULATION OF STATUTORY HEALTH INSURANCE: THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED 
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 16 n.20 (1984). 
384 See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text. 
385 See 13 JUNE 1911 ACT, supra note 211, amended by 1964 Amendment, supra note 257, arts. 
36,37. 
386 See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text. 
387 See SWISS HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 288, at 40. 
388GLASER, supra note 383, at 189. 
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the total income of Swiss sickness funds. 389 According to Glaser, in 1985, 
the federal subsidy was only lO%.390 Based on my own estimate of 1996 
heath care spending,391 on the division of costs by sector in 1993,392 and 
on the estimate of Federal Office of Social Insurance of 1996 premium 
subsidies,393 by 1996, the first year of LAMal, the federal subsidy fell to 
less than 7%. 
Decreasing cantonal support for health care has exacerbated the 
effect on Swiss health insurance premiums of the declining percentage 
of premiums subsidized by the federal government. The Swiss cantons 
were slow to take up any of the slack in government contributions 
created by past federal retrenchment.394 Sixteen cantons failed to qual-
ify at all, or did not qualifY for the full amount to which they were 
entitled based on population, for the matching funds provided by the 
Federal Decree on Temporary Measures to Protect Solidarity.395 Three 
cantons received their due, while seven others actually received more, 
beneficiaries of amounts not distributed to the non-quali£Ying can-
tons.396 
In 1993 alone, cantonal spending on health care declined by 4%.397 
Over the period 1992-1994, public hospital costs rose by a total of 
7.5%. Charges for hospital services to health insurers rose by 28.5%: 
"The cantons reduced their hospital deficits at the expense of [health 
insurance] premium payers. "398 The 50% maximum enacted in LAMal 
Article 49 has served, quite predictably, more as a target than as a spur 
to eliminate overcapacity.399 
Health insurance premiums have long been a large and visible part 
of the outlays of the Swiss household.40o According to the Swiss Depart-
389 See GRAF v. D. SCHULENBERG, supra note 383, at 16 n.20. 
390 See GLASER, supra note 383, at 189. However, it does not seem that these figures can be 
strictly comparable. 
391 I projected the provisional estimate for 1995, 35,600 millions Swiss francs, to 1996 using as 
a projection factor the rate of growth for 1995 over 1994 (35,600/33,730. See 36 milliards poor 
la sante, 96:5 CAMs ACTUEL 68, 69. That produced an estimate for 1996 of 37,607 million francs. 
392 See id. at 68. 
393 1,813 million Swiss francs. See L'OFAS s'exprime sur des questions relatives Ii LAMal: Expose 
de M. Walter Seiler, directuer de l'OFAS, 96:2 SECURITE SOCIALE 85, 86 (1996). 
394 See GLASER, supra note 383, at 189-90. 
395 See Swiss Reform, supra note 73, at 28. 
396 See id. 
397 See 36 milliards pour la sante, supra note 391, at 68, 69. 
398 See Pas de hausse des tan! hospitaliers, mais moins de lits, 1/2:96 CAMS ACTUEL 4, 5. 
399 See id. 
400 See OECD, THE REFOR..'I: OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS: A REVIEW OF SEVENTEEN OECD COUN-
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ment of the Interior, the average increase in premiums for 1997 was 
12%, far greater than the growth in income.401 These rapid, steep in-
creases in premiums have quite understandably generated widespread 
discontent.402 Although a consensus for further change seems unlikely 
to emerge soon, proposals for change have arisen from a variety of 
sources.403 
G. Can LAMal Contain Costs? 
The freedom available to insureds under LAMal to change health 
insurers404 creates a tremendous incentive for health insurers to con-
tain costs. Certainly, an insurer capable of negotiating lower fees would 
gain a competitive advantage which would sharply increase market 
share. The new law enables insurers to offer reduced access for lower 
prices.405 Network products will inevitably make their presence felt. 406 
In the shorter term, insurers must turn to the government to enforce 
the cost-cutting provisions of the new law, especially those that prohibit 
passing the costs of overcapacity on to insurers.407 The Swiss cantonal 
authorities have substantial statutory power over rate-setting.408 How-
ever, the financial stake· that they have in the outcome of rate negotia-
tions leads to higher costs for compulsory insurance.409 If the new law 
is to succeed in cutting the rate of growth in health care costs in the 
shorter term, the Federal Council will need to make full use of its right 
to settle appeals made to the Council. 
TRIES (1994) 289. By 1993, over 50% of Swiss households devoted more than 8% of their income 
to the payment of health insurance premiums. See id. Given the sharp increases of recent years, 
the modal contribution will have risen substantially. See 36 milliards pour la sante, supra note 391, 
at 68-69. 
401 See DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DE L'lNTERIEUR, ENTRETIENS DE WATTENWYLL 2 (Nov. 1996) 
[hereinafter WATTENWYLL). 
402 See id. at l. 
403 See Entre extension des prestations et coups de frein aux coUts, 96:12 CAMs ACTUEL 192. 
404 See supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
405 SeelAMa1, supra note 320, aru. 32, 33, 39, 41; see also supra notes 347-51 and accompanying 
text. 
406See WATTENWYLL, supra note 401, at 2. 
407 See lAMa1, supra note 320, aru. 44, 47. 
408 See supra notes 357, 362, 363, 365, 367, 369 and accompanying text. 
409 See supra note 398 and accompanying text. To quote from the text prepared by the Depart-
ment of the Interior for distribution to participants in a November 1996 conference at Wattenwyll 
between the Federal Council and members of the parties making up the government, "[t)his 
state of affairs demonstrates that the federal authorities cannot content themselves with a wait-
and-see policy." WATTENWYLL, supra note 401, at 7. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps more than any other factor, separation of powers gives 
"federalism"41o in the American form of government greater substance 
than it has in Canada. A parliamentary form of government, at least 
with strong, national parties, tends to mute expression of regional 
interests at the national level. The need for, and habit of, party disci-
pline, tends to make regional variation a factor in the formulation of 
a party program, but not in its enactment, in both houses of a federal 
legislature, whatever the aspirations of the drafters of the national 
constitution may have been. 
In the United States, the separation of executive and legislative 
power, and the frequency with which different parties have control-
led one of these two branches of government, has made the mem-
bers of both houses of Congress more responsive to local interests, 
if not to their states as co-sovereign entities.411 In this respect, the 
House of Representatives is more responsive to local interests than the 
Senate. 
The United States, now that the Russian Empire has finally dissolved 
into its constituent parts, seventy years after the death of Czar Nicholas 
II, is the most diverse country in the world, considered along almost 
any axis of identity except the linguistic. Considered racially, and by 
ethnic group within race, religiously, and politically, Americans appear 
at every point along each spectrum. These differences are not accepted 
in the United States with the same tolerance with which the Swiss, for 
example, have always accepted their differences in 13;nguage and, more 
recently, their differences in religion. 
Switzerland comes closer in many relevant respects to the United 
States than Canada. It is diverse with respect to language and religion. 
It is governed at the federal level by a stable coalition which operates 
by consensus, which comes closest among the systems we have exam-
ined to approximating the habitual compromises necessary to enact 
legislation in the United States. The referenda powers give localities 
greater real power than they possess elsewhere. 
The Swiss health care system establishes national standards for qual-
ification for the mandatory program of health insurance. It permits 
41°1 define "federalism" weakly, as the power of local interests to determine national policy. 
Federalism in its classic sense, as the power of the states as sovereign entities to share in the 
determination of national policy, died in the United States, if it ever existed, with the Civil War. 
4ll See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS 49 (2d ed. 1989). 
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the cantons further to shape the health program within their jurisdic-
tions. The benefits which must be provided in order to qualifY the 
mandatory program are more comprehensive than Hillary Clinton has 
ever dreamed of for an American program of reform. 
A program that gives the states as much flexibility as the Swiss give 
the cantons seems appropriate to American diversity. It would seem to 
have greater political appeal than many of the options currently dis-
cussed. Its form might easily resemble the original form of the Cana-
dian federal legislation, without the bias that legislation had toward 
administration by the provincial government. That is to say, the states 
could have the freedom to enact even voluntary programs as long as 
their programs succeeded in covering 95% of the population and 
provided a minimum level of benefits. Such a high threshold would 
almost certainly require a compulsory program in almost every juris-
diction. 
The federal government would guarantee to maintain its current 
level of contributions to qualifYing programs, but would revise the 
form of its health care subsidies along lines I have suggested else-
where.412 The states would be given a direct stake in the cost-effective-
ness of their programs by assigning residual costs to them, as in the 
Canadian provinces. The states would have the power to impose an 
employer mandate or not, to require different delivery mechanisms, 
to prohibit balance billing, and to impose fee schedules, among other 
things. 
Perhaps the most important power the states must have, however, is 
the power to impose a global budget. Permitting state variation may 
be the only way to gain global budgeting in any jurisdiction. It is 
possible that American reform could succeed in containing costs even 
without global budgeting. The diversity of delivery mechanisms, which 
includes totally integrated systems like staff model HMOs with salaried 
providers and owned hospitals, along with full payment by insureds of 
any differential costs of the plan they choose, could be enough to make 
competition effective in containing delivery costs. State experimenta-
tion with a wide variety of delivery systems could also help establish the 
most effective forms of administration. 
The United States is indeed unique. However, only fools fail to learn 
from the experience of others. The experience of the countries we 
have examined should prompt us to temper our optimism for the 
412 See Donahue, supra note 1, at 170-80. 
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outcome of any program of reform, which should itself recom-
mend state experimentation. If we let fifty flowers bloom, some of 
them may survive long enough to prove themselves worthy of being 
transplan ted. 
